South Carolina Law Review
Volume 48

Issue 3

Article 2

Spring 1997

Squabbling in the Shadows: What the Law Can Learn from the
Way Divorcing Couples Use Protective Orders as Bargaining Chips
in Domestic Spats and Child Custody Mediation
Randy F. Kandel
Yale Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Randy Frances Kandel, Squabbling in the Shadows: What the Law Can Learn from the Way Divorcing
Couples Use Protective Orders as Bargaining Chips in Domestic Spats and Child Custody Mediation, 48 S.
C. L. Rev. 441 (1997).

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Kandel: Squabbling in the Shadows: What the Law Can Learn from the Way Di

SOUTH CAROLINA
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 48

SPRING 1997

NUMBER 3

SQUABBLING IN THE SHADOWS:
WHAT THE LAW CAN LEARN FROM THE WAY
DIVORCING COUPLES USE PROTECTIVE ORDERS
AS BARGAINING CHIPs IN DOMESTIC SPATS AND
CHILD CUSTODY MEDIATION
Randy FrancesKandel'
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION ................................
PROTECTIVE ORDERS IN INTIMATE ARGUMENTS ..........

441
445

A. Arguing About Protective Orders ................
B. "This Is My House; This Is My Son:"
The Case of David and Shoshanna ...............
C. "Safefrom Screaming:" The Case of John and Laura ....

445

II.

PROTECTIVE ORDER TALK AT MEDIATION .............

462

IV.
V.

A. Safeguards; Nexus Tests; and Time, Place, and
MannerRestrictions ........................
B. "This Is My House; This Is My Son:"
The Case of David and Shoshanna ...............
C. "Safefrom Screaming:" The Case of John and Laura ....
D. "Bruisesand Bumps:" The Case of Craig andAlicia ....
WHAT THE LAW CAN LEARN .....................
CONCLUSION ...............................

450
456

462
469
474
481
486
493

I. INTRODUCTION

This ethnographic article is about the strategic use of protective orders by
parents to gain an advantage in child custody disputes. It examines the actual
dialogue of couples participating in court-sponsored child custody mediation
in Los Angeles, as they describe arguments they have had at home and
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negotiate custody agreements with the mediator. The examination reveals how
and why some parents are able to employ or reinterpret the law of protective
orders and how protective orders sometimes reinforce rather than rectify
existing power imbalances.' It shows how successful parents use protective
orders to create legally protected safety zones around themselves and their

homes. Further, it shows how these parents use their protective orders as a
predicate for negotiating favorable custody allocations in court-sponsored
mediation. My purpose is not to prescribe, but to describe the important, often
outcome determinative, disputes and negotiations that parents have between
themselves when acting pro se or out of earshot of their lawyers. In demonstrating how legal principles, creatively interpreted and reinterpreted by
parents, enter the very fiber of family disputes and alter the balance between
legal power and interpersonal power,2 these dialogues teach an objective
lesson to lawyers: listen carefully to what your clients say they say and do and
educate them in the substantive meaning and argumentative scope of the laws
that apply to them. Mediators should take caution as well to elicit, listen
actively, and respond to parents' narratives about "talking law" and the
underlying interpersonal power dynamics that the narratives encode.
This article examines, in fine-grained detail, the actual language of three
mediation sessions in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, Conciliation

1.We still know very little about how protective orders work in practice. Most empirical
research has focused on telephone calls to the police and the subsequent response of the legal and
criminal justice systems. (For an excellent, recent review of the empirical studies on the effect
of protective orders on domestic violence, see Lisa Frohmann & Elizabeth Mertz, Legal Reform
& Social Construction: Violence, Gender and the Law, 19 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 829, 835-41
(1994)). But the vast majority of protective orders, perhaps most of those issued relatively
routinely following flare-ups between estranged and divorcing spouses, do not result in police
telephone calls or criminal sanctions. Instead, their existence is incorporated into the private
ordering ofmarriage and divorce and "folded into" whatever negotiation or litigation takes place,
as a fact, issue, or "talking point" in the package of concerns.
2.The concrete ethnographic analysis of interacting legal and lay concepts and their
relationship to the dynamics of power is a cornerstone of much contemporary scholarship in legal
anthropology, which has intellectually influenced the author in manifold and diffuse ways. See,
e.g., SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JusTIcE AND GETtiNG EVEN (1990); BARBARA
YNGVESSON, VIRTuous CmIzENS, DISRuPTIvE SUBJECTS (1993). In a recent essay, Alan Hunt
describes this research and analytical perspective:
Its hallmark is the contention that legal life and everyday social life are mutually
conditioning and constraining and that elements of legal consciousness play an active
part in popular consciousness and practices. Law enters into the way that life is
imagined, discussed, argued about, and fought over; this imagining, talking, arguing
and fighting shapes the law.
Alan Hunt, Law, Community, and Everyday Life: Yngvesson's Virtuous Citizens & Disruptive
Subjects, 2 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 173, 178-79 (1996) (book review); see also ALAN HUNT,
EXPLORATIONS IN LAW AND SOcIETY: TOWARD A CONSTITUTIVE THEORY OF LAW

(1993)

(further developing this theory); Frank Munger, Sociology ofLawfor a PostliberalSociety, 27
LOY. L. REV. 89, 100-05 (1993) (discussing ethnography and the constitutive theory of law).
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Services Division. The parties are couples who had temporary restraining
orders (TROs) in place at the time of mediation. The case sessions ["This Is
My House; This Is My Son:" The Case of David and Shoshanna; "Safe from
Screaming:" The Case of John and Laura; and "Bruises and Bumps:" The
Case of Craig and Alicia]3 are part of a larger library of more than forty full
sessions observed and taped by the author as part of an extensive research
project conducted between 1991 and 1994 with follow-up research in the fall
of 1996.1 1 have selected these sessions because of the significant amount of
conversation devoted to protective orders during the mediation process. In
each case, I use the parties' own words to trace the discussion related to the
protective orders in, at least, two instances-(1) an argument or fight that
occurred at home between the mother and father prior to the mediation session
that triggered or involved the protective order and (2) during the mediation
session when the presence of the protective order comes to bear on the issue
of custody. Thus, in some sense, the parents' narratives are made to serve two
functions-first, as accounts of what happened at a past time and second, as
components of persuasive arguments made during the mediation session for or
against a particular custody arrangement. To gain the upper hand regarding
custody in the different contexts, a parent had to make successful use of the
"law" of protective orders in a different way.
In Part II of this article, I discuss protective orders as legal processes that
are intended to protect domestic violence victims by changing the relationships
of power and place, interpersonally and between the family and the legal
system. Also, I address how protective orders become issues in intimate
arguments at home. I then proceed to a detailed discussion of the at-home
arguments between David and Shoshanna and John and Laura. In the argument
at home, the successful parent convinces the other parent that the thrust of a
protective order limiting contact and communication between the spouses acts
to exclude the unsuccessful parent, at least temporarily, from the protected
zone. According to the successful parent, this zone includes the children and
the parent himself or herself, even though no protective order with such terms

3.All case names are fictitious-created by the author for analytical purposes. To protect the
anonymity and confidentiality of the participants, names ofall participants, places, and individuals
otherwise referred to are pseudonyms.
4.To protect the anonymity and confidentiality of all concerned, the audiotapes remain the
property of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, Conciliation Services Division, without
whose support and endorsement this research could not have been done. Transcripts of the
audiotapes are available from the author. The author wishes to express thanks and gratitude to
the entire professional and administrative staff of the Los Angeles County Superior Court,
Conciliation Services Division, for opening their doors and their hearts to my inquiring eye. Their
consummate skill and unflagging energies towards making divorce an easier life transition
continue to be a source of both inspiration and fascination.
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may actually be in force. Simply put, one parent convinces the other that the
law applies to the successful parent's version of the facts.
In Part 1H, I discuss mediation as a more complex, although still informal,
legal forum that presents different challeiges for a parent who would make
strategic use of a protective order in getting a preferred custodial allocation.
Although the presence of the mediator as a neutral third-party facilitator
mitigates emotional confrontation between the parents, the mediator also has
an independent obligation to consider the child's best interests. The parent who
convinces the mediator that a particular custodial allocation is best for the
child's interest, thereby winning the mediator's support, has won a possibly
crucial victory in negotiating a preferred agreement. Accordingly, in this
forum, a successful parent's strategy involves using the protective order as a
kind of informal evidence that the child's best interest lies in a particular
allocation of parenting time and responsibilities. I discuss the strategies that
are effective in this forum, in terms of the substantive law that constrains
mediation, and then proceed to a detailed analysis of the mediation negotiations of David and Shoshanna, John and Laura, and Craig and Alicia.
In Part IV, I return to a, more theoretical discussion. I argue that the
substantive laws of protective orders and of child custody are linked through
their common concern with the legal protection of vulnerable people by
assigning them to safe, stable places.5 This link enables parents to use
protective orders as weapons in securing child custody. Once a parent has
created a safe stable home by using a protective order to exclude the other
parent, it becomes possible to argue for custody on the basis of the child's
need for a safe stable home.
However, pre-existing interpersonal power dynamics significantly affect
a parent's ability to effectively use the protective order to eject the other
parent and to gain custody. The cases indicate that it is the relationally more
powerful spouse who often prevails and that the relationally more powerful
spouse sometimes is and sometimes is not the nominal "victim" or holder of
the protective order.
As the forum changes, however, from the informal argument at home, to
the court sponsored mediation context, rhetorical skill increasingly becomes
the decisive weapon. Further, rhetorical skill is not a mere function of
interpersonal power. Although interpersonal power is one component of

5.This analysis owes an intellectual debt to the contemporary theoretical concern with law,
bodies, and places as a form of power and knowledge that originates with philosopher Michel
Foucault. Foucault has analyzed the development and distribution of technologies of power
through the social construction of bodies and their location and movement in spaces. His
influence on legal anthropology has been all pervasive. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS &
CIVILIZATION (1965); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF THE CLINIC (A.M. Sheridan Smith
trans., Pantheon Books 1973) (1963); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH (Alan Sheridan
trans., Pantheon Books 1977) (1975).
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rhetorical skill, the educated knowledge of what to say and how to "talk law"
persuasively is vitally important. Parents' arguments and behavior inevitably
become progressively legalistic and legally acceptable as the forum becomes
more formal, even when the balance of interpersonal power remains
unchanged.
The learned substantive and stylistic components of rhetorical skill provide
a means for counterbalancing and overcoming pre-existing power inequalities
in the "user friendly" forums where parents speak for themselves, that have
become an integral part of family law process. Attorneys can help their clients
to change the balance of power and get more preferred outcomes by teaching
them to understand and argue the substantive law of their case at home, at
mediation, and in other forums in which they must speak for themselves.
Similarly, mediators can better rectify power imbalances between the parents
by listening to and encouraging narratives that reveal the strategic ways
parents use and talk law between themselves, as well as the power dynamics
that underlie the strategies.
II. PROTECTIVE ORDERS IN INTIMATE ARGUMENTS
A. Arguing About Protective Orders
Protective orders are highly potent and relatively recent remedies for
domestic abuse.6 In theory, protective orders change the balance of domestic
power and control: by empowering the victim through a special right to rapid
police attention and by providing legal sanctions against the abuser. 7 The

6.Protective orders were first introduced in the 1970's, as a consequence of activism by
women's rights groups. For a brief history of the protective orders movement, see Mary
Schouvieller, Leaping WithoutLooking: Chapter142"s Impacton Ex ParteProtectionOrdersand
the MovementAgainstDomestic Violence in Minnesota, 14 LAw & INEQ. J. 593, 600-03 (1996).
7.For example, in California, a willful and knowing violation ofa protective order is a crime.
CAL. FAm. CODE § 6388 (West 1994). Pursuant to California Penal Code section 273.6, any
intentional and knowing violation is a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1000
or imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or both; a violation that results in
a physical injury is punishable by a fine of not more than $2000, imprisonment, or both; and
subsequent convictions entail steeper punishments. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.6 (West Supp.
1996). Local police policies encourage or oblige officers to make arrests when responding to calls
about domestic fights where protective orders are in place-situations that would otherwise be
ignored as family arguments. The Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C.A. § 14031
(West 1995), fosters such policies by conditioning federal aid upon the institution of arrest
policies and related matters. See Reva B. Siegal, "The Rule ofLove:" Wife Beatingas Prerogative
and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996). California law fosters police involvement and arrest
by providing that "(a) A law enforcement officer shall use every reasonable means to enforce an
emergency protective order ... [and] (b) A law enforcement officer who acts in good faith to
enforce an emergency protective order is not civilly or criminally liable." CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 6272 (West 1994). A significant amount of recent legal scholarship stresses the importance of
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orders place strict limits on the abuser's ability to contact and communicate
with the victim-being controlled in this way destroys the abuser's satisfaction in controlling the victim.9
Protective or restraining orders"° "protect" by doing three things."
First, they change the fluid boundaries of interpersonal space and force the
estranged intimates to renegotiate their relationship subject to fixed boundaries
which are illegal, even criminal, to cross. Second, they expand the victim's
personal space, creating a legally defined safety zone around the victim's body
and often the victim's home, property, and telephone line.' Third, they
prosecution in domestic violence cases. See, e.g., Angela Corsilles, Note, No-Drop Policies in
the Prosecutionof Domestic Violence Cases: Guaranteeto Action or DangerousSolution?, 63
FoRDHAm L. REV. 853, 858 (1994) (concluding "that no-drop policies can play an important role
in combatting domestic violence because they account for victims' realities, counteract
longstanding justifications for inaction, and transform the statutory promise ofjustice for battered
women into a credible threat of prosecution for their batterers"); Mary Elizabeth Collins,
Mahoney v. Commonwealth: A Response to Domestic Violence, 29 NEw ENG. L. REv. 981
(1995) (supporting the proposition that a combination of civil and criminal prosecution for
domestic violence does not amount to double jeopardy); Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose:
Mandated Victim Participationin Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HAlv. L. REV. 1849
(1996) (recommending that victims be required to testify in domestic violence prosecutions);
Dorothy Carl Quinn, Comment, Ex ParteProtection Orders:Is Due ProcessLocked Out?, 58
TEMP. L.Q. 843 (1985).
8.See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6320 (West 1994) (providing that "[tihe court may issue an
ex parte order enjoining a party from contacting ....
telephoning, contacting repeatedly by mail
with the intent to harass, or disturbing the peace of the other party").
9.Over the past few years, feminist legal scholarship has significantly redefined the psycholegal portrait of abusive couples from one of men who are out of control and weak women who
are too passive to resist to one of men who use force to exercise control and women who do their
best to resist. See, e.g., Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who
Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 71, 88-89 (1992) (criticizing the
"heat of passion" argument as applied to mitigate the offenses of men who kill their spouses and
arguing that wife-killers often have a history of being wife-beaters); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal
Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 71-93
(1991) (developing the concept of "separation abuse" and arguing that women may be at the
greatest risk when they try to leave their batterers, triggering the need for increased legal rights
and protections); see also Jeffrey T. Even, Washington's Address Confidentiality Program:
Relocation Assistancefor Victims of Domestic Violence, 31 GONZ. L. REv. 523 (1995/96).
10. In the domestic violence context, the words "protective order" and "restraining order" are
virtually synonymous and will be used interchangeably in this article.
11. For a full state-by-state description of the relief that protective orders provide (or do not
provide) see Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, ProvidingLegal Protectionfor Battered
Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HoFsm L. REv. 801 (1993); see also
Nancy L. Hathaway & John P. Zanini, Update and Overview of Massachusetts Case Law
Considering the Scope and Meaning of the Abuse Prevention Statute and Related Issues for
Prosecutors,30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 375 (1996); Hollis L. Webster, Enforcement in Domestic
Violence Cases, 26 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 663 (1995) (describing how Illinois protective orders

work).
12. In regard to the relationship between the abuser and the victim, the California statutory
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create a rapid response rescue chain-the holder of a protective order can
summon the police and, at the least, expect help in warding off words and acts
that would otherwise be regarded as everyday interactions.13 In so doing,
protective orders radically alter the way divorced and divorcing couples work
out their post-divorce and co-parental relationships.
Protective orders are, necessarily, "user-friendly" remedies." They can
be obtained, at least temporarily, ex parte, quickly, and without the costly
assistance of lawyers."5 Speed and ease of obtainment are vitally necessary
if restraining orders are to protect victims and potential victims from
dangerous partners and ex-partners.
scheme divides the behaviors that may be enjoined into three categories. CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 6320 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996) (providing that "[t]he court may issue an ex parte order
enjoining a party from contacting, molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually
assaulting, battering, harassing, telephoning, . . . contacting repeatedly by mail with the intent
to annoy or harass ... or disturbing the peace of the other party"); CAL. FAm. CODE § 6321(a)
(West 1994) (providing that "[tihe court may issue an ex parte order excluding a party from the
family dwelling, the dwelling of the other party, the common dwelling of both parties, or the
dwelling of the person who has care, custody, and control of a child to be protected from
domestic violence for the period of time and on the conditions the court determines, regardless
of which party holds legal or equitable title or is the lessee of the dwelling"); CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 6322 (West 1994) (permitting the court to enjoin any "specified behavior that the court
determines is necessary to effectuate orders under Section 6320 or 6321"). Any orders that may
be issued exparte may, of course, also be issued after notice and a hearing. CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 6340 (West 1994).
13. See supra note 3.
14. See, e.g., Regina DuFresne & Jonathan S. Greene, IncreasingRemedies for Domestic
Violence: A Study of Maryland's 1992 Domestic Violence Act in the Courtroom, 6 MD. J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUEs 155, 170, 172 (1995) (reporting results of an empirical study finding

that after brief hearings-less than fifteen minutes long-petitions for exparte protective orders
were granted in 85% of the cases, and in contested hearings, petitioners prevailed 44.3% of the

time).
15. The California statutory scheme provides for protective orders to be obtained in three
ways. First, an "ex parte [sic] emergency protective order" can be obtained immediately, at any
time of the day or night, even through a law enforcement officer's telephone call to a judicial
officer. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6250 (West 1994). The law enforcement officer must assert that there
is an "immediate, present danger of domestic violence, based on a ... recent incident of abuse
of threat of abuse," and the judicial officer must find that there are "reasonable grounds" to
believe the immediate, present danger exists and that an emergency protective order is necessary
to prevent its occurrence or recurrence. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6250-51 (West 1994). An exparte
emergency protective order expires on the earlier of five court days or seven calendar days from
the date of issuance. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6256 (West 1994). Second, a protective order may be
issued "to restrain any person for the purpose of preventing a recurrence of domestic violence
and ensuring a period of separation of the persons involved, if an affidavit shows, to the
satisfaction of the court, reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse." CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 6300 (West 1994). The restraining order in this instance is accompanied by a notice of hearing.
If the defendant fails to appear, the court may grant the requested order exparte for a period of
up to three years. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6302 (West 1994). Finally, a restraining order may be
issued after notice and a hearing. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6340 (West 1994).
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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The minimal threshold of assault or threat of assault necessary to obtain
a protective order without committing perjury can, unfortunately, be satisfied
at some point by almost anyone undergoing even a relatively amicable
divorce.16 Protective orders can thus be used by genuinely hurt and scared
people not only to provide safety, but also as an affirmative element of divorce
strategy: a use considered to be both sensible and appropriate and freely
discussed at mediation. As the mediation tapes demonstrate, such orders can
easily be used as a method of keeping a pesky, estranged spouse at bay17 or
as a strategy of dispute escalation."
Once in place, the protective order itself can become a source of tension
and argument between the parties because the terms are misunderstood 9 or
the restrictions impede the free flow of information between the parties and
about the children or one parent believes the other is using the protective

16. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6203 (West 1994) (stating "'[a]buse' means intentionally or recklessly
to cause or attempt to cause bodily injury, or sexual assault, or to place a person in reasonable
apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or another").
17. For example, consider the following dialogue:
Mediator: Yeah. Now, you're here on a restraining order. What's that all about? What
happened with that? ... [ellipsis throughout this article indicate not only the author's
selective omission of intervening text but also the speaker's pause, interruption, orjump
in thought].
Violet: I, umm, went to this house where he said he lived with a friend, and I was
gonna tell him that if he didn't leave me alone, I was gonna put the restraining order.
But instead, y'know, he went ahead and did it.
Mediator: And did it first....
Was there violence during the time the two of you were
together? . . Did the two of you have physical fights?

Joe: No, we... you see she was physical to me ... when my car was damaged.
Mediator: Mm-hmm. And you made a police report ... It doesn't sound as if you
thought you were physically in danger.
Joe: Uh, physically in danger? No. That's ridiculous .... I put a restraining order
on her mother also ...

because I ...

I really feel that Violet's an adult, and I'm an

adult. We can have this out between ourselves, you know. We don't need other parties
involved .... This is her and I. This is our child. Her mother wasn't there when we
conceived this child. OK?
18. For example, see Craig's explanation for getting a restraining order, infra note 21.
19. Consider, for example, the following exchange:
Mediator: Now, the Tuesday [visit] is going to be an option and you are going to call
to let her know.
Craig: Yes.
Mediator: Now, that means if you don't call, she's free to assume you're not
coming...
Alicia: But wait a minute. If he goes along with the restraining order, that means he
can't call me at all.
Mediator: Well, the restraining order is against you contacting him. Not him contacting
you.
Alicia: Oh. Well, then...
20. For example, in the following dialogue there has been an abrupt change of the residence
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss3/2
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order as a subterfuge to avoid telephone calls or visitation.21 The terms and
scope of the protective order itself are often contested by the parties, providing
a renewed opportunity for the manipulation of interpersonal power. Changes
in interpersonal spatial relations wrought by the terms of a protective order do
not simply and purely keep spouses apart so that, like prize fighters in their
respective comers, they will be unable to fight. Rather, they change the terms
of the fight and the tokens of power from direct control of another's body to
control of a critical space, so that the interpersonal boundary line fixed by the
order becomes a point of contention. In the following example, the terms of

of two teenage children from their mother's to their father's because of the children's dislike of
the mother's new live-in fiancee. The mediator proposes that it would be a good idea for the
parents to stay in communication about the children, but the father (unaware that a restraining
order can be modified) believes he is prohibited from communicating with the mother under the
existing restraining order. The conversational exchange shows the stilted rigidity of interaction
that results from his too scrupulous adherence to the literal terms of the protective order as he
understands it.
Mediator: (to Eva) Would you like him to keep you informed about what they're up to?
Eva: Sure.
Mediator: Would you be willing to do that Mavic?

...

Would you give Eva that

information about what is happening with your two kids? If your children have conflicts
at school, would you be willing to tell her that there is a meeting at school for the
children?
Mavic: No, because she doesn't come and speak. I have a restraining order. I can't call
her. I can't write letters.
Mediator: You can't write letters? You can't call her? Would you want that kind of
information, Eva?
Eva: I do. I want it, but I put the children first.
Mediator: [Sensing that the parents really do want to share information, the mediator
moves to a blackboard and begins to explain custody options with the help of a
diagram.] Joint legal custody means that both of you would share information and the
right and responsibility to make decisions regarding your children's health, education,
and welfare ....
Mavic: [laughing] This is impossible, [y]ou understand why. Because I have a
restraining order. Believe me.
21. The following dialogue is illustrative:
Craig: Well, would you like to know that I haven't seen [my son] in almost, what, nine
weeks?
Alicia: Craig, you haven't even made an attempt to go call my mom and see him, and
you know how long I've been waiting for you to. Get a phone call from you? To even
ask about the baby?
Craig: Wait! Why should I call you and tell you I'm calling?
Alicia: Because I can't call you. I can't ....
Craig: Yeah, but that's my instructions. That I'm not to call you at all. That comes
down from the judge. He goes wait until the court date so you can settle it in court.
Alicia: Yeah, but see then you're making the choice of not wanting to see Ben.
Craig: No. I am trying to protect myself ....
Alicia: From what? From me?
Craig: Oh, yeah. Very much.
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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a protective order state that Gregory is not to come up to the house when he
arrives to pick up the children. Each parent interprets the limit differently:
Gregory: And the court order said, when I pick up the kids, no exchange
of y ... Alexa comes to my car. I am in the car, following the court
order.... I'm not getting out of the car. I'm not yelling.
Alexa: When he pulls into the driveway, y'know, I just hold my breath,
because he's not supposed to. It's just his way of playing games.
For Gregory, the language of the protective order means that he is not to
get out of the car. For Alexa, the same language means that Gregory is to stay
at the curb and not drive onto the driveway-which is her property. Thus, the
very provision designed to prevent a dispute provokes one, and the border
becomes a flash-point for argument. Unfortunately, but inevitably, it is across
this tense border-this interpersonal demilitarized zone-that parents transfer
the child or children for visitation. The protective order physically separating
the parties makes lawful, amicable, shared physical family affection impossible. Normal flexible and fluid child care arrangements and rearrangements are
rendered problematic in the presence of protective orders. Protective orders
are designed and conceptualized to prevent arguments between the parents, but
they work in this way only if parents adhere literally to the "letter of the law."
Often, the protective order becomes a point of tension-as every child
exchange occurs across a legally demarcated and potentially policed border.
The parent who reaches out to take a baby from the arms of a co-parent
inevitably intrudes into that co-parent's private space.'
B. "This Is My House; This Is My Son:" The Case of David and Shoshanna
The case of David and Shoshanna dramatically illustrates the predicament
and the way that parents give new meaning to a protective order when they
argue over its boundaries at home. The divorcing couple has an eighteen
month old toddler, Joshua ("Josh"). Their marriage broke up when Shoshanna
discovered that David had a girlfriend,' with whom he had fathered a child

22. This statement is neither exaggerated nor metaphorical. Numerous custody agreements in
California avoid face to face contact between the parents during the child's transfer by having the
delivering parent drive up and put the child in a car seat in the receiving parent's car, while the
receiving parent watches from the window. After the delivering parent drives away, the second
parent rushes out and takes the child from the car seat. When it is time for the child to go home,
the ritual is repeated in reverse.
23. David tells the following story, revealing his attitude towards these women:
She's [referring to Shoshanna] going to a very good pediatrician right near our
house ....

Uh, good group, um, the other woman, and I don't, y'know, everything's

out in the open, um, who I had a-a-child with, and uh, it's, looks like it is my child,
uh, went to the same doctor, because they were born in the same hospital, and they get
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss3/2
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at about the same time Josh was born and whom he was continuing to see.2'
Shoshanna,rs with the help of her lawyer, had originally obtained a protective
order giving her exclusive occupancy of the house. However, at the hearing
on the order, the judge discovered that the house was David's separate
property-purchased before the marriage- --26 and, thus modified the order.
The modified order stated that both David and Shoshanna could live in the
house but included mutual restraining orders to the effect that neither party
could touch or speak to the other.27

kind of referred to this medic .... You know, they're kind of tied in, they're kind of
like a referral... group there. So she went to the same doctor and then, and she
stupidly gave my name as the father, so I guess it got around that I'm the father of both
these children, two different women are bringing two different kids. And the girl, and
... and Shoshanna, uh, suspected that they were talking behind her back. So instead
of looking for a doctor nearby, she finds some doctor that's on the other side of Los
Angeles.
24. Shoshanna explains that they "[a]lways argued about it. Because he'd keep telling me, 'I
wanna see that daughter... I - I, so, and I have to go over there and meet that woman and the
daughter, they need me, like you need me.'" She also tells a story about how she was attacked
at David's office by David's girlfriend:
I went to the office with Josh before we go to the procedure of the divorce. And uh,
David was working inside of the office ... So I drove by; I went in. And ... I went
to the bathroom and David was there with Josh, so I came back from the bathroom, and
I hear[d] noise of baby, y'know, so I thought, in the li-, the library. So I opened the
door... and she was there, with their baby, and she jumped at me, she start calling
me names, hitting me, I'm thinking "I don't know what I'm doing here. Why I have
to be involved in this matter," y'know. So they [are] banding together against me,
y'know, like I'm the one who [is] hitting her, I'm the one who arresting, arrested her,
y'know, things like that.
25. For the most part, all of the parents discussed in this article represent themselves pro se
[or pro per as it is known in California]. Only two parents, both mothers, are represented by
attorneys. Shoshanna had a lawyer represent her in obtaining the original protective order and
at the protective order hearing. David is an attorney and represented himself. Laura, in Case
Two, was also represented by an attorney, while her husband was not. Attorneys are almost never
present at mediation sessions. The mediators have the authority to exclude them and always do
so when only one parent is represented. If attorneys choose to wait outside, they are typically
brought in only to hear the terms of the agreement at the end ofthe session. Very uncharacteristically and with bad results, Shoshanna's lawyer was permitted to interject at the end of the
session. Perhaps the mediator permitted this because David was a lawyer representing himself.
26. The judge was not legally obligated to reach this conclusion. Under California law, a
protective order can give a party exclusive occupancy of the family residence, regardless of the
form in which title is held or which party is likely to have the house after the assets are
distributed. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6321(a) (West 1994). David explains, "The judge had indicated
her, uh, direction of who-how she's gonna decide in this case. And she will let me keep my
house that I owned for six years before she came to be, before my wife came over. It's a year
and a half marriage. OK?"
27. Shoshanna explains the terms of the restraining order to the mediator as follows:
Shoshanna: Uh, we had a restraining order that he can't come to the house, but then the judge
say[s] that um, we can't have a restraining order because, .. . because we haven't decided what
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Returning home after the hearing, both Shoshanna and David try to play
with Josh, and they engage in a tug of war across the legally enforceable
boundary between them. The struggling parents attempt to exercise power over
each other by pulling the baby into their own private space. In the accounts
they tell during separate sessions with the mediator, each parent describes the
other as being the transgressor.
David: I was playing with him, we were playing hide and seek, we're
laughing [and] she comes in and picks him up and takes him out of the
room .... And she starts crying and he starts crying.
Shoshanna: []e [was] always sitting next to me, so I was there with Josh,
so he grabs him, and urn, Josh starts crying.... He twisted my arms,
y'know, and he took Josh away from me.
Each parent strives to take Josh from the other parent and keep him within
his or her perceived personal and legally protected space. Thus, they
reconfigure the household space in a way that reflects the power imbalances
between them. The ostensible purpose of the protective order was to empower
Shoshanna, a diminutive Israeli pianist and music therapist, against the verbal
and physical ravages of David,2" an athletic, two hundred pound, hard talking
and highly charged trial attorney.29 Shoshanna sits at the mediation session

the house is, and it's his house. So she just told him, the judge told him, just come and... not
be a-round here. Or talk to him or something like that.
Mediator: O.K., so he's restrained from talking to you, but he's...
Shoshanna: Right. Or touch me or anything like that.
28. Even David's own words indicate that he has bullied her throughout the marriage:
Uh .... she was pregnant when we got married, that's why we got married. I lost my
father less than a year before she got pregnant, and I wasn't gonna have an abortion at
that point. I wasn't, y'know, I emotionally, I couldn't do it.
I had done it in the p-, in
college, y'know a, a few times, y'know. But not at this point in my life. And, uh, and
I hope that it'll work out with her, but it wasn't a loving relationship. So, so be it.
Y'know, uh, it's not a fault state. I'm not gonna be punished for what I ever did or
didn't do.
29. David describes himself as follows:
I'm a pretty strong individual. I'm aggressive, I-I don't know many successful attorneys
who aren't. I'm a sole practitioner, I'm very successful. Every day I'm in there,
burning my ... brains out. At the end of the day, I'm, my head is spinning, 'cause I
have s-, well I love it, 'cause it's so stimulating, it's intellectually stimulating, I'm
helping people. I enjoy it. I'm not abusive. I'm-I'm, I do it because I like to help
people. I do like to make money, I do like to have financial security .... I'm, I'm

highly educated, I'm highly motivated, I'm very athletic.
David, in fact, uses these same points, to make an argument for custody of Josh: "[N]ow
he needs a lot of time with his father, because I'm a survivor, I, I'm, I'm successful, I'm athletic,
I intend to teach him how to play tennis, throw the football around, uh, teach him to be a
survivor in this world, which I don't think she can do, as well as I can do."
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looking almost as white, delicate, and translucent as the sheer nylon blouse she
wears as she tells her story.
Yet, when the couple begins to fight, the order's intent is lost. Although
both Shoshanna and David are subject to exactly the same legal restraints,
their concepts of personal space and their respective abilities to defend that
space differ importantly. David seems to have the bigger personal space and
the greater right to intrude on Shoshanna's space. David talks as though the
entire living room constituted his personal space. In his account, he and Josh
are all over the floor "playing hide and seek." To him, for Shoshanna even to
enter the room is an annoying intrusion that makes Josh cry. Viewed
objectively, the protective order legally entitles Shoshanna to pick up Josh,
provided she does not touch David.
In Shoshanna's description, David, as the aggressor who makes Josh cry,
intrudes upon Shoshanna's legally protected personal space. She holds Josh in
her arms as David moves closer and closer, violating first the spirit and then
the letter of the protective order, and finally taking Josh away. Although
David and Shoshanna's narratives seem superficially to be equal and opposite
versions of the same events (each talks about the other grabbing the child and
making him cry), they are not. David takes more than he deserves, and
Shoshanna gets less than her entitlement.
David ultimately gets Shoshanna out of the house. She goes unhappily,
leaving Josh behind. Shoshanna is, at least temporarily, excluded from the
family unit as both David and Shoshanna's accounts detail.
David: I said, "Shoshanna, you said you were gonna leave. Well, just
leave." And when she's gone, one minute later, he's for-, he [Josh] forgets
the person's gone.
Shoshanna: I told him, "Please let" and Josh was... follow me, up to the
room. And he grabbed him and he told me, "This is my son, and this is my
house, and he doesn't need you." So, y'know I left. So now I don't know
where he is.
Without the will to call the police, Shoshanna gains no real protection from
the restraining order. Yet, why does Shoshanna not call the police? If this
were merely a consequence of David's raw power and Shoshanna's relative
30
weakness, this story would just be one more account of a bullying husband.
However, David is actually able to tap into the legal power of the protective

30. The stories of women forced to leave home, with or without their children, in order to
flee from abusive husbands, are commonplace. See, e.g., Martha F. Davis & Susan J. Kraham,
Protecting Women's Welfare in the Face of Violence, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1141 (1995)
(telling stories of women forced to flee from abusive spouses and how flight exacerbates their
poverty and the need for welfare reform); see also Even, supra note 9.
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order. He interprets and construes it to his advantage, making the law appear
to be on his side as he pushes Shoshanna out of the house with his words.
As the next excerpt from Shoshanna's narrative reveals, when David says,
"This is my son, and this is my house, and he doesn't need you," she leaves
because she hears in those words not only David's powerful insistence but also
a claim of legal right. She hears David as claiming that because the judge said
that the house belongs to David, that the judge will also say that Josh belongs
to David, that David should stay in the house, and that David will get custody.
Shoshanna quotes David as using the protective order to support his claim to
custody: as a vehicle to aggrandize his personal space to include the entire
house, to keep Josh within that space, and to exclude Shoshanna from the
family unit.
Shoshanna: I told him, "Please," you know, "don't take him away." And
he [said], "mins is my house, this is my son. You don't know what
happened in court today. The judge likes me and he won't like you, and I'm
gon-, I'm likely to get custody, .. . and you get [a] hundred dollars and find
a place to live, because this is my house.31 You better get used to the
idea."
As Shoshanna tells the story during the mediation session, David has
literally used the words and logic of the law to create an informal legal
argument against Shoshanna's remaining in the house. 32 David has manipulat31. One may quibble that David's argument is not strictly speaking a "legal argument,"
emphasizing points of law, but a confabulation of a legal position with a judge's personal
preference or "liking" for one party rather than another. Effectively, this difference is irrelevant
since it is the law's power and authority, whether personalized or abstract, that David now brings
to bear on Shoshanna. Further, empirical studies of what divorce lawyers and clients actually say
to each other have revealed the same confabulation. Austin Sarat &William L.F. Felstiner, Law

and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 L. & Soc'y REV. 93 (1986); Austin Sarat &
WilliamL.F. Felstiner,LegalRealisminLawyer-Client Communications, in LANGUAGE AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 131 (Judith N. Levi & Anne Graffam Walker eds., 1990); AUSTIN SARAT &
WILLIAM F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS (1995).
32. It is not necessary, and in fact is highly unlikely, that Shoshanna's report of David's
statement is a verbatim repetition of what he actually said the night before. In a previous article
discussing some of the Los Angeles County court sponsored mediation tapes, I have argued that
such reported speech is actually "constructed dialogue"-a present memory of past perception
spontaneously retold to meet the moods and purposes ofthe ongoing conversation. Randy Frances
Kandel, Power Plays:A Sociolinguistic Study of Inequality in Child Custody Mediation and a
Hearsay Analog Solution, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 879, 898-903 (1994). In reaching this conclusion,
I have followed sociolinguist Deborah Tannen and a long line of scholars who have dealt with
the multi-layered complexities and shifts of meaning in reported speech as it moves from speaker
to speaker and context to context. See DEBORAH TANNER, TALKING VOICES (1989); RESPONSIBILITY AND EVIDENCE IN ORAL DISCOURSE (Jane H. Hill &Judith T. Irvine eds., 1993); M.M.
BAKHTN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION: FOUR ESSAYS (1981); V. N. VOLOsHINoV, REPORTED
SPEECH

(1927).
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ed a situation, on the general aspects of which his and Shoshanna's accounts
agree, so as to force Shoshanna out of the family circle by giving her the
impression that his power is now backed by the law's authority.33 Shoshanna
leaves, feeling that the law is not on her side, that she needs to tread carefully,
and that it was a strategic error for her to have obtained the initial temporary
restraining order giving her exclusive occupancy of the house.
The twists in interpretation and efficacy that the protective order assumes
as David and Shoshanna argue in their own living room are characteristic of
their particular family history. For example, David, who describes himself as
"aggressive" and a "survivor" and Shoshanna as "young, naive, and
stubborn," has always wielded the upper hand. Having married Shoshanna
because she was pregnant, he simultaneously continued a relationship and bore
a child with another woman. David complains that Shoshanna does not take
child rearing advice from David's mother and that she arbitrarily changed
pediatricians when she learned that David's girlfriend was using the same one.
Shoshanna is an immigrant, speaks English as a second language, and is an
undergraduate student. David is a high income attorney, who supports the
entire family. Shoshanna explains that when she discovered David's girlfriend
she lost so much weight that she had to stop nursing Josh.34 She complains
that David leaves her alone in order to work long hours and engage in sports,
tells her that his girlfriend and her child are as important to him as she is, and,
in essence, turns his legal skills against her in a personal way-trying to get
her to make admissions into his dictaphone and having his mother write an
affidavit in David's petition for sole custody of Josh stating that Shoshanna is
an impatient and immature mother.
If David, the stronger and controlling spouse, appears the victor at this
point, has the protective order accomplished anything? The answer must be:
Yes, it has changed the discourse. To summarize, the law of the protective
order has changed the struggle from fighting to legal argument and from a
discourse of violence, in which one parent tries to forcefully control the
other's body, to a discourse of separate and private spaces defined by law.
David and Shoshanna are forced to change the discourse of their dispute to a
struggle over who controls the larger space, the home, and the body of their

33. It is also irrelevant whether David's statement is "correct" from the point of view of legal
analysis. What is significant is that Shoshanna believes his legal analysis is correct. David reports
himself as saying to Shoshanna, "Y-you, don't have to leave, but if you're uncomfortable, you
brought it upon yourself. But Josh is staying here in his home." Even this more softly toned
account, which is equally unlikely to be a verbatim report of actual conversation, includes
insinuations that are sufficient under the circumstances for Shoshanna to conclude that the law
has turned against her and that she is responsible for it.
34. Shoshanna explains, "I nursed him, y'know. And I nursed him through six months. And
then when I found out about that woman he has, I-I lost weight, I couldn't nurse anymore,
y'know."
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child, Josh. David wins; the balance of power has not tipped but the terms of
argument have-now emerging in the language of the law are concepts such
as home and stability, which are important factors in determining custody."
Given the family dynamics and David's legal career, it might seem
predictable, almost inevitable, that Shoshanna perceive the antagonistic
authority of the law and David's personal power as alter egos of one another.
Likewise, David interprets the law in the light most favorable to him so that
the meaning and effect of the protective order works to his advantage. This
case might seem to be so atypical as to constitute a poor example. The
following case, however, reveals a positive relationship between interpersonal
power, family history, and strategic use of the protective order that is not so
seemingly predictable from demographic characteristics like gender, size, and
education.
C. "Safe from Screaming:" The Case of John and Laura
In this case, Laura, a fiery, five-foot Salvadoran immigrant mother with
a grade school education, successfully wields her verbal power and strategically manipulates the presence of a protective order. She portrays herself as the
victim of her college-educated former husband, John. At mediation, Laura
ultimately negotiates a revised visitation schedule that significantly reduces
John's contact with the couple's six year old daughter and seven year old son.
Just as the previous case illustrates a victim further victimized by a protective
order in which the interpretation and meaning are co-opted by the more
powerful spouse, this case reveals a victim who becomes empowered by a
protective order, as the legal paradigm intends. Again, the result is due at least
partly to the interpersonal power long wielded by one party during and after
the marriage, a power that exists despite that party's categorization as a
victim.

35. It is significant that in some legalistic way David's "house" becomes synonymous with
Josh's "home," frightening Shoshanna with the possibility that she may be denied custody. Even
"house" and "home" are subject to social construction and redefinition in the contexts of
dominance and subordination. According to authors Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson,
The idea that space is made meaningful is of course a familiar one .... The more
urgent task ... is to politicize this uncontestable observation. With meaning making
understood as a practice, how are spatial meanings established? Who has the power to
make places of spaces? Who contests this? What is at stake? ...The ability of people
to confound the established spatial orders, either through physical movement or through
their own conceptual and political acts of re-imagination means that space and place can
never be 'given,' and that the process of their sociopolitical construction must always
be considered.
Akhil Gupta & James Ferguson, Beyond "Culture:" Space, Identity, and the Politics of
Difference, 7 CuLTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 6, 11, 17-18 (1992).
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The couple has been divorced for five years. The mediation session
between John and Laura follows a fight, after which Laura obtained a
temporary restraining order preventing John from calling or visiting the house
and, in effect, from seeing or talking to his children. The fight began when
Laura's cousin, who was living with Laura, invited John over to visit and help
babysit. The babysitter and the cousin had to leave early and John agreed to
stay until Laura came home from work. Laura came home and was surprised
to find John at the house. They started yelling at each other. Although each
insists the other started it and their respective accounts differ-Laura claims
John was drunk and threw a wine glass at her,3" while John insists that he
was sober and that the glass was accidentally dropped37-they agree on
certain basic facts. Laura deliberately hit John over the head with a wine
bottle, causing an injury that required stitches, and Laura received a bruise.3"
Laura: I picked up a bottle and I hit him on the head.... I don't know if
he fell down or what.
John: [A]ctually she sent me to the hospital.... [S]he hit me over the head
with some type of glass object that broke and, uh, uh, fractured my skull
and I had to get stitched up at a hospital .... I had blood flowing all over
me, one of the neighbors gave me a few napkins and, uh, I went to the
emergency hospital and... six hundred bucks, they stitched me up....
She hit me over the head with something that had wine in it, I didn't even
know if it was [a] decanter or a wine bottle, and once it was on me, it was
wet.
On these facts, either John or Laura could easily meet the threshold for
obtaining a temporary restraining order, or a judicial officer could issue
mutual protective orders. Laura and John, however, respond very differently
to the crisis. Laura makes a police report, has x-rays taken, gathers evidence,
and obtains a temporary protective order that, in effect, denies John access and
contact not merely as to her, but also as to their children.
Laura: "I have a doctor's report and, uh, pictures to prove that ....
[Tihe
police came ... my attorney has the pictures, you can see, y'know ....

36. Laura states, "[H]e picked up a glass, y'know, I guess obviously that's what it was, a glawine glass, and threw it at me, caught me like, were, like from there to that door, that's where
he caught me, and hit me right here. I didn't even know, I mean, I just put my leg like that, I
was wearing boots and blue jeans."
37. John states, "I put the shoulder bag on my, uh, athletic bag on my shoulder and I walked
by this little case, knocked over a wine glass, y'know, I caught it, and then I was angry, threw
it on the floor, broke it."
38. Laura relates, "[A]II of a sudden I have blood all over me... and it didn't look that bad,
it's like, I couldn't feel the pain ... and it was just a bruise ... the next day it was a real bad
bruise."
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I had been going to my chiropractor for my back, and I had an appointment
on, urn, y'know, the following, un, Monday, Tuesday, whatever, and I
understand by law that they have to report those things. So I had to be there
for a physician and x-rays .. the week before. So what they took of it,
because I don't have, my body was so sore, and uh, they started doing the,
uh, physical again and they took more x-rays of my neck, inside, swollen,
or something that could have only happened by, y'know, my doctor says is
from some kind of something and that's why I don't want him in my house.
By contrast, John's approach is to stay out of Laura's way until she clams
down.
John: I've never been one to go to court and, urn, y'know, make complaints.... And uh, y'know, none of these things when they, I mean, I just
kind of learn to live with it.... When I broke the wine glass, she was in
this panic state, and all I wanted was to get out of there, y'know....
[A]fter she gets mad, and she goes through these tirades, and then she'll
loosen up later. Urn, if she is, if she is phobic and really afraid, y'know,
I... should stay as far apart as possible.
By giving Laura a chance to calm down, John hopes to pave the way for
further consensual visitation with the children. By staying away, however,
John actually distances himself from the family circle. He is unable to visit
with or talk to his children; thus he risks damaging his relationship with them
socially, emotionally, and possibly even legally.
Laura, by contrast, seizes upon the opportunity to obtain a restraining
order against John, thus legalizing a de facto zone of protected privacy that
includes her house and children. If John's statement that he tends to lie low in
such situations is a roughly accurate statement of his actual behavior, Laura
might even know that she does not need to seek a restraining order to keep
John away. Even if genuinely and legitimately terrified, Laura is strategic
enough to use the opportunity to obtain a temporary restraining order that
enhances her position.39
As in the case of David and Shoshanna, the introduction of a protective
order changes the discourse of the dispute which must now take place on the
law's terms. Rather than striving to control one another's bodies, by throwing
wine glasses and wine bottles, the struggle is now about who controls the
home place in which the children reside. As in the previous case, the "law"
39. At one point during the mediation session, Laura says that she has filed about six police
reports. Her narrative indicates that she has learned (perhaps from talking to police, court clerks,
or domestic violence volunteers) how to "make a case" for obtaining a protective order and to
bring all of the supporting documentation, including photographs and police reports, to the
mediation session. John, who actually had to receive stitches in his head after the fight, does none
of these things.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss3/2
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has won a victory, as has the spouse who can speak in the law's terms.
Significantly, Laura, a Salvadoran immigrant of limited education, by availing
herself of the user-friendly legal process, is as able as David, a practicing
attorney, to speak in the law's terms, although she does so in a different way.
While David actually constructs a legal argument that links together legal
rights and the judge's possible preferences, Laura uses the law by applying for
the legal remedy of the protective order and by bringing x-rays, photographs,
and police reports with her to make her case.' John, like Shoshanna, turns
away, leaving his children and his legal rights behind. Thus, in both David
and Shoshanna's case and in John and Laura's case, the spouse who convinces
the other that the law of the protective order is on his or her side prevails.
Are the dynamics of interpersonal power surrounding the use of the
protective order the same or different in these two cases? On a superficial
level, they seem to be very different. Granted, Shoshanna and Laura are both
tiny immigrant women, and they each hold a restraining order against their
bigger, better educated, U.S. born husbands. Yet, Shoshanna leaves home,
while Laura keeps John away. The protective order, in accordance with its
intended purpose, does, in fact, protect tiny and emotionally sensitive Laura
and her children from John's threatening outbursts. This is, however, a matter
different from the question of whether Laura is able to seek the order while
John slinks away because of the power Laura already possesses within the
terms of the relationship.
The dialogue indicates that Laura's response to the fight builds on a
preexisting pattern, through which Laura has been consistently edging John out
of the family circle. For example, although it is likely that John and Laura
have joint legal custody, the most common custody arrangement in California,
both of them act as though Laura has sole custody41 and John has only
40. Volunteers and clerks who assist petitioners for protective orders in drafting their
affidavits and in completing the requisite forms often teach them to use such concrete evidentiary
details and to transform their domestic fight stories into narratives ofabuse and victimization. See
Robert Emerson, ConstructingSerious Violence andIts Victims: Processinga Domestic Violence

Restraining Order, 6 PERSP.
41.

ON SOC. PROBS.

3 (1994).

Laura: I don't know if physical custody, is like, joint; I don't know how that
works, but, like I couldn't take them out of the country without his permission.
Mediator: Do you have joint custody or ....
Laura: No. I have sole custody.
Mediator: You have sole custody.
Laura: Sole physical custody.
Mediator: But you can't take them out of the country.
Laura: Uh-huh, right.
Mediator: You have sole physical but you have joint legal custody or...
Laura: What does the legal custody mean?
Mediator: Because, um, legal custody means who is to make major decisions
about the children's lives, such as their schooling, their religion, um, any kind
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visitation rights.42 In fact, both Laura and John describe the incident as
though Laura already had a protective order prohibiting John from crossing
her threshold, although Laura admits and even complains about the fact that
no such protective order exists. John complains of always being uncomfortable
in Laura's house.
John: It's always a little bit difficult for me even to be at the house, y'know,
the kids would ask me to stay, and I would never stay when she would, she
asked me to leave I'd leave. Sometimes the kids would, would prolong it
five minutes ....

Uh, so when she came in the door, she was angry, she

says, "What are you doing here, uh, you just can't waltz in and out anytime
you want" and uh, uh, I started to pick up my stuff.... But so as not going

over there, I mean ... it was never that great for me, uh, I, uh, I did that
because the kids wanted [me] to.
Laura: I just said, "Hey, this is my house, and I want you to get, you know,
leave my house.". . . I, when I was here I was told the last time that I had
a restraining order, and every time anything happened the police said "No,
this is not a restraining order." It was like whatever you give here, and it
gets signed by the judge.... That's all I ever had ... and I-I was under
the impression that I had a restraining order ...

so that's what I wanted

right now.... We have a temporary one now, that we are-hoping.., to
get.
Laura's words, "This is my house

. . .

leave my house," echo those of

David in the previous case, as Laura succeeds in "protecting" the domestic
zone and the children from John's intrusions.43 John justifies Laura's

of medical issues that are non- that are not emergencies.
Laura: Mmm

Mediator: Who's going to make these decisions?
Laura: I have, um, decision making...

42.

Mediator: Oh?
Laura: I remember this from my divorce, y'know, that I could do all these
things.
Mediator: You don't have?
Laura: No.
Mediator: You don't have to inform him.
Laura: I don't have to inform him. As far as I know.
Mediator: OK. We'll double-check on that just to make sure.
Laura: OK.
John: She has custody, and, uh, she really has the final say-so, if she wants

them for aweekend. If I want them, I speak up, and if she doesn't have plans,
y'know.
43. Although John does not have the same legal right to be in Laura's house that Shoshanna
has to be in David's, he is not a trespasser; he is the invited guest of Laura's nephew who is
living in Laura's house. In either event, as in the previous case, what is important is not that
Laura's legal analysis is correct, but that John thinks it is.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss3/2
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hysterical behavior as a recurrent emotional problem, resulting from childhood
trauma in violent and politically troubled El Salvador. He takes the blame for
the incident by saying, "The buck stops with me!" John, tends more than
anything else, to withdraw when Laura is angry.
John: [S]he would, I think, let things build up inside her. Her father died in
a gun battle when she was two, and she used to ... I just call it freak out,
there [were] seven or eight times she was hospitalized in San Sebastian
County in an institution, where she would-a lot of alcohol, and then she'd
just lose touch, where if [you] didn't hold her down, she'd actually come
after you. Her nephew ... who was watching the kids that day, he
remembers all these times, y'know, she bit him. Uh, she's chased me with
a machete ... I wouldn't know what to do to hold her, and then she'd get
up and just start breaking things and tearing things .... I remember I took
her to a psychologist, y'know, whenever she sees a rat, she just freaks and
panics. If we're watching a movie and she had her hand on my arm, she
would literally dig her nails into my arm and draw blood.
Moreover, by having the children's primary residence with her, Laura has
succeeded in gaining a measure of control over John. Laura regards John's
presence in the house as a dangerous intrusion, but her resentment of him is
such that she is not willing to bring the children to him. Changes in his
residential and employment situation have rendered John unable to keep the
terms and times of the original custody agreement. John has been working,
with no great success, as a commissioned salesperson. He is obligated to see
his customers when they want to be seen and, thus, to work irregular hours
that make adherence to a strict visitation schedule difficult. Consequently, John
has to ask to see the children, and Laura controls access. Thus, John envisions
himself as becoming increasingly dependent on Laura.
John: We haven't followed it [the agreement] strictly, but I think it's been,
there've been times that I, uh, depending on where I was working, where I
saw more, and other times less .... B-before ... we would just talk and
work it out. She wanted to get as much scheduled in advance, uh, lately,
when I've worked it's been very sporadic, so it's been dependent on, uh,
y'know, when and if I work, and, uh, she really has the final say-so, if she
wants them for a weekend. If I want them, I speak up, and if she doesn't
have plans, you know .... I was seeing them, uh, before, uh, this incident... [j]ust on a call basis, y'know. It wasn't scheduled the way it used
to be ... It was whatever she wanted, and she always got them for the
holidays, and she dictated policy.... She usually gets what she wants, and
I get what's left over.
Ironically, John's predicament merely makes Laura regard him as
undependable. She tells the mediator, "He's gotten so he doesn't keep the
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agreement." The erratic visitation pattern gives Laura the upper hand. John
feels he is intruding even when, as with the visit that started the fight, he is
an invited guest of someone residing in the house (Laura's nephew) and doing
Laura a favor by babysitting. John's entry into the house, and especially the
altercation that follows, reaffirms and intensifies Laura's ring of personal
power. This dynamic is both evident and exacerbated through Laura's and
John's responses to the fight-responses which have occurred so often that
they have become habitual. In effect, through the temporary restraining order,
Laura has succeeded in "legalizing" the de facto ring of power that she has
steadily been building around herself, her house, and her children.
In sum, if one looks only at the externally visible characteristics of these
two cases, such as who is the petitioner and who is the respondent, or the
gender and socioeconomic background of the victorious party, the cases seem
to have very different results. By looking more deeply into the actual dialogic
and interpersonal dynamics of the parties, however, marked similarities
emerge. In each case, the spouse with the, at least temporary, psychological
advantage wins, but only by speaking in the "law's language" and convincing
the other parent that the sanction of the law, rather than sheer physical might,
is on his or her side.
Because she was the stronger person in the relationship, Laura was able
to function as an empowered victim and to use the restraining order that she
held against John as a means of securing a protected safety zone, which
included her house and the children. By contrast, Shoshanna, as the weaker
party, was unable to turn a protective order to her advantage. In fact, it was
David who purloined the power of the protective order, forging a protected
zone that included the house and the child.
III. PROTECTIVE ORDER TALK AT MEDIATION
A. Safeguards; Nexus Tests; and ime, Place, and Manner Restrictions
California law requires mandatory court sponsored mediation on any
outstanding child custody claim prior to a judicial hearing.' The mediator's
44. "Ifit appears on the face of a petition, application, or other pleading to obtain or modify
a temporary or permanent custody or visitation order that custody, visitation, or both are
contested, the court shall set the contested issues for mediation." CAL. FAM. CODE § 3170 (West
1994). An agreement reached during mediation and signed by the parents goes to the judge for
signature, becoming a legally binding court order. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3186 (West 1994). The
policy of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, Conciliation Services Division, is to give
parents ten days in which they can rethink the agreement or discuss it with their attorneys and
to notify the court in writing if they wish to have the agreement cancelled. According to David
Kuroda, this policy implements section 3186(a) of the California Family Code. Interview with
David Kuroda, Division Chief of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, Mediation and
Conciliation Services (Feb. 13, 1997). Section 3186(a) provides that an agreement reached in
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statutory role is to enable the parents to reach a self-determined custody
agreement, called a "parenting plan," that is in the "best interest of the
child"-an amorphous standard that includes, inter alia, both "close and
continuing contact" with each parent45 and the child's stability46 and safety.
Parents almost always participate in the mediation sessions pro se: the
mediators have the right to exclude attorneys and typically do so, unless each
parent has counsel and both parents want their counselors present.' In the
cases discussed thus far, Laura and Shoshanna are represented by counsel,
while their children and husbands are not,48 but the attorneys enter only at
the conclusion of the substantive mediation session. 9
The mediators are skilled professionals'0 with graduate degrees in the

mediation "shall be reported to counsel for the parties by the mediator on the day set for
mediation or as soon thereafter as practical, but before the agreement is reported to the court."
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3186(a) (West 1994).
45. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3161 (West 1994). Section 3161 provides in pertinent part that "[tihe
purposes of a mediation proceeding are as follows: (a) To reduce acrimony that may exist
between the parties. (b) To develop an agreement assuring the child close and continuing contact
with both parents that is in the best interests of the child." Id.
46. See infra note 66.
47. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3182(a) (West 1994) (providing that "[t]he mediator has authority to
exclude counsel from participation in the mediation proceedings ... if in, the mediator's
discretion, exclusion of counsel is appropriate or necessary"). During the entire course of my
research, I observed only one session in which attorneys participated. Lawyers sometimes wait
outside or "drop by" if they are in the courthouse on other business. Typically the mediator will
speak with the attorney at the end of the session to summarize the agreement that has been
reached.
48. David, as a lawyer, is representing himself.
49. See infra note 75 (describing the entrance and rather unusual intervention by Shoshanna's
attorney).
50. Pursuant to the California Family Code, as a counselor of conciliation, a mediator must
possess the following minimum qualifications:
(1) A master's degree in psychology, social work, marriage, family and child
counseling, or other behavioral science substantially related to marriage and family
interpersonal relationships[;]
(2) [a]t least two years of experience in counseling or psychotherapy, or both,
preferably in a setting related to the areas of responsibility of the family conciliation
court and with the ethnic population to be served[;]
(3) [k]nowledge of the court system of California and the procedures used in family law
cases[;]
(4) [k]nowledge of other resources in the community to which clients can be referred
for assistance[;]
(5) [k]nowledge of adult psychopathology and the psychology of families[;]
(6) [k]nowledge of child development, child abuse, clinical issues relating to children,
the effects of divorce on children, the effects of domestic violence on children, and
child custody research sufficient to enable a counselor to assess the mental health needs
of children.
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mental health professions and, for the most part, years of mediation experience. They are alert to rectifying power imbalances 5 through skillful

interventions, regulation of turns of talk, proposing options, framing and
refraining issues, and meeting with the parents in separate sessions. Mediators
have neither the authority to render decisions nor, in Los Angeles county, to
make recommendations to the court.52 They can, however, propose or elicit
options and assist parties in fully considering such options, including the
implications of various options for the child's best interests. Agreements in
mediation are ideally reached through a series of often subtle micro-persuasive
steps, as each parent and the mediator offers and considers options.53
The mediation forum potentially provides a safer and more neutral arena s4

CAL. FAM. CODE § 1815(a) (West 1994). The Los Angeles county mediators have considerably
more experience than the statutory minimum. In addition, the conciliation services runs an
intensive internship program lasting approximately nine months and including observation, comediation, and supervised mediation. At present, part-time mediators are hired only after
completing this internship program.
51. Numerous statutory provisions obligate the mediator to be neutral and impartial and to
rectify power imbalances. For example, uniform standards ofpractice for mediators must include
"[t]he conducting of negotiations in such a way as to equalize power relationships between the
parties." CAL. FAM. CODE § 3162(a)(3) (West 1994). Mediators should maintain a neutral stance
and be knowledgeable about their own biases and sensitive to individual gender, racial, ethnic,
and cultural values, as well as differences. CAL. R. CT. ApP. Div. I 26(c) & 26(c)(3); In
addition, the mediator "should be vigilant about a power imbalance in the parental relationship ... including gender-biased attributions regarding parental role, intimidation, and economic
advantage." Id. at 26(h). The degree to which mediators can or should be neutral and impartial,
sensitive to gender imbalances, and interventionist in the proposal of particular options has been
a subject of considerable academic debate that need not be revisited here. See, e.g., infra note
85. This article investigates the question of how the parents' strategies in using existing protective
orders differ during the court-sponsored mediations as opposed to confrontations at home.
52. In California, whether or not a mediator can make recommendations to ajudge is a matter
of local rule. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3183(a) (West 1994) (providing "[t]he mediator may, consistent
with local court rules, submit a recommendation to the court as to the custody of or visitation
with the child"). Although Los Angeles county is a "non-recommending" jurisdiction that
prohibits mediators from making recommendations to judges or hearings officers, mediators may
recommend a child custody or psychiatric evaluation. L.A. COUNTY R. 14.5.
53. Furthermore, at any time during the child's minority, parents may request a mediation
session to modify an existing custody agreement or to work out a specific problem. Mediation
can thus be used as a virtually perpetual resource. One mediator audiotaped by the author
explained to a parent:
I don't know if you've read anything about the fact that you can come back as often as
you want. You don't have to have anything litigating; uh, all you have to do is to have
a file with us, and you can make an appointment anytime you need to come back. For
example, we have a lot of parents who work on step-up plans. They might start with
a plan when the child is very young; that is one way, and that might be drastically
altered by the time the child is 3 or 4; again, maybe altered again when the child is in
kindergarten and has vacation schedules and things like that.
54. In making this statement, I am not insensitive to the views of those who regard
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than "the home" for couples with protective orders to work out their
differences.5 5 In addition, the presence of a protective order, or other indicia
of domestic violence in the case file, triggers certain special protections. By
statute, in such circumstances, victims have a right to mediate entirely through
separate sessions in which the co-parents never meet face-to-face and the
mediator acts as a shuttle diplomat between them. The statute obliges media-

tors to notify parents of this right and to honor their request for separate

sessions.5" Signs are posted in all the offices giving notice of this right. The
majority of mediators strongly recommend that such parents meet separately,
at least during the beginning of the session.57
court-sponsored mediation as dangerous and unfair to women in general, Martha Fineman,
DominantDiscourse:ProfessionalLanguageandLegalChangein ChildCustodyDecisionmaking,
101 HARV. L. REv. 727 (1988); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: ProcessDangersfor
Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991), or those who would regard it as dangerous to female
victims of domestic violence, Charlotte Germane, et. al., MandatoryCustody MediationandJoint
Custody Orders in California:The Dangerfor Victims of Domestic Violence, 2 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 175 (1985); Penny L. Willrich, Resolving the Legal Problems of the Poor: A

Focus on Mediationin Domestic Relations Cases, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE

REv. 1373, 1377 (1989)

(pointing out that "fin the domestic violence situation, mediation has been deemed dangerous for
the battered woman, because neither good faith nor equality of bargaining power exists in a
battering relationship"). While recognizing mediation's imperfections, I clearly come down on
the side of mediation's more numerous supporters. I believe that my own ethnographic work
shows both mediation's relative sensitivity and flexibility as a dispute resolution system that
recognizes and rectifies power imbalances and the fact that interspousal power is both more
complex and less gendered than these scholars claim. It is, in any event, not germane to revisit
that hoary argument here-for mediation's detractors inevitably contrast their negative views of
mediation with a rather idealized vision of third party decision making. My point here is only to
observe that court-sponsored, child-custody mediation provides a safer and more neutral
environment than an at-home argument between a divorcing husband and wife when one of them
holds a restraining order against the other.
55. When a dispute is moved from one forum to another, the discourse, the conceptualization
of the issues, and the points of argument often shift. This is especially perceptible as one moves
from less to more formal forums. Barbara Ynguesson & Lynn Mather, Courts, Moots, and the
Disputing Process,in EMPIRICAL THEORIES ABOUT COURTS 51 (Keith 0. Boyun & Lynn Mather
eds., 1983); Lynn Mather & Barbara Yngvesson, Language,Audience, and the Transformation
of Disputes, 15 L. & Soc'Y REv. 775 (1980-81).
56. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3181 (West 1996).
57. Mediators also typically provide holders of restraining orders with information about
domestic violence services. For example, the mediator gives Shoshanna a long explanation about
such services:
I have a brochure that I want to give you. It has a lot of resources in it on, uh,
counseling and that kind of thing. There is a women's survival card. The booklet is this
thick. O.K. That's the Surviving Domestic Violence, uh, part of it that was put [out]
by the L.A. Commission on Assault Against Women and the Family Violence Project
of Jewish Family Services.... Dad will be interested that you might find some of the
resources, um, helpful to you. And Information and Referral is a number that you can
call, um, to make referrals to, for all the different shelters, for all the different
counseling programs. Um, I've also underlined in yellow here a list of women who
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Ironically, however, the protective separation of the parties places a
stronger communicative burden on each parent. While the mediator's verbal
or tacit support for a parent's requests is always helpful in procuring a
preferred agreement, it is significantly more so when the parents do not meet
face-to-face because in such "shuttle diplomacy" mediation, a parent must rely
on the mediator to favorably summarize his or her position to the co-parent. 5
Since the mediator is under a statutory obligation that requires both equal
empowerment of the parents and furtherance of the child's best interests59
and, moreover, because the mediator is operating under significant time
pressures and is constrained by specific laws and policies,' the mediator will
most fully understand and appreciate a parent's request for a particular custody
arrangement if the request intersects with the mediator's own concern for the
child's well-being and general ideas about appropriate agreements.
The parent who would be an "empowered victim" must work the existence
of the protective order into the conversation. That is, at mediation, the
protective order must become a kind of informal evidence about the parents'
legal and interpersonal relationship that the empowered parent uses to support
a particular parenting plan, that is advantageous in terms of the laws and
policies that guide and constrain the mediator in facilitating an agreement. My
analysis of numerous mediation transcripts reveals that there are three principal
approaches or tactics: linking the protective order to possible danger to the
child; limiting the co-parent's time by manipulating the custody and visitation
schedule; and making arguments based on the stability of the home.
As to linking a protective order directly to possible danger to the child, the
legal context of such a connection is that protective orders may be indicia of
violence by one parent against the other. California law provides that, in
making a determination of the best interests of the child, the court must
consider "[a]ny history of abuse by one parent. . . against the other

have [been] in domestic violence situations. And there are a lot of resources here.

58. See Randy Frances Kandel, Time and StructureofMediation Sessions in the Los Angeles
County ConciliationCourt, 30 FAM. & CONC. CTs. REv. 474 (1992) (discussing how separate
sessions alter the balance of power between mediators and parents because although the parents
are empowered relative to each other, they are relatively disempowered in comparison to the
mediator who is the only person who fully knows what each parent has said).
59. See supra notes 44 and 45.

60. For example, mediators guide parents towards agreements that are in general accord with
public policy, as expressed in California statutes. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020 (West 1994) (stating
"[t]he Legislature finds and declares that it is the pubic policy ... to assure minor children
frequent and continuing contact with both parents ... and to encourage parents to share the
rights and responsibilities of child rearing"). As a matter of practice, they also facilitate and
encourage agreements that are in accord with concepts of what is "developmentally appropriate"
for children, that are based on, inter alia, contemporary views on developmental psychology.
Randy Frances Kandel, 'Developmental Appropriateness' as Law in California Child Custody
Mediation, 35 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 75 (1995).
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parent." 61 Mediators, in my observation, appear to implicitly employ a
"nexus test:" questioning and probing the victim parent to determine whether
they see or believe there is a connection between violence towards the parent
and violence, abuse, emotional disturbance, or other danger to the child. This
test is, however, hard to meet for several reasons.
Many parents, including the three couples discussed in this article, come
to mediation with temporary restraining orders that have been obtained ex
parte upon the affidavit of only one of the parents. Under local scheduling
practices in the family law section of the downtown Los Angeles County
Superior Court, typically, if parents come to court with both outstanding
custody issues and a temporary restraining order, the parents will be referred
first to custody rhediation, and then to "Department 8" for a hearing on the
restraining order.' Although the presence of a temporary restraining order
is sufficient to trigger the alleged victimized parent's right to mediation in
separate sessions, statutory law will not allow it to be used as evidence of the
acts alleged. 63 And while evidentiary rules do not apply in mediation, the
persuasive value of a temporary restraining order in raising a specter of
possible danger to the child is minimal, especially to mediators familiar with
its ease of obtainment.
Further, the level of abuse, to either the co-parent or the child, contemplated by the statute as being a mandatory factor for consideration in making a
best interest determination is that which rises to a level of criminality. 4 As
interpreted in practice, the statute does not establish a presumption that abuse
to the co-parent is abuse to the child. Rather, the abuse to the child must be
a reality or at least a serious risk. 65 Thus, a parent may come under the
statute where the abuse that parent has inflicted on the co-parent evidences that
the parent will be a danger to the child, or where the child has emotionally or
psychologically suffered as a consequence of witnessing domestic violence.

61. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011(b) (West 1994).
62. Personal knowledge of the author, based on field research.
63. CAL. FAM. CODE § 234 (West 1994) (stating in pertinent part, "Ithe automatic granting
of the ex parte temporary restraining order... is not... competent evidence in any proceeding
of any prior history of the conduct so proscribed occurring between the parties").
64. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011(b) (West 1994). For these purposes, abuse against the co-parent

is defined as "intentionally or recklessly to cause or attempt to cause bodily injury, or sexual
assault, or to place a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that
person or to another." CAL. FAM. CODE § 6203 (West 1994).
65. Although currently there is no published case law regarding the statute, the language
seems to contemplate an evidentiary finding on the issue of abuse to the child in which the person

alleging the abuse carries the burden of persuasion. It, thus, significantly differs from
presumptive statutes. See, e.g., Report of the Missouri Task Force on Gender and Justice, 58

Mo. L. REv. 485, 495 (1993) (concluding that under the Missouri Adult Abuse Act, "[o]nce
abuse is found, [following a hearing] the statute creates a presumption that the best interest of a
child is served by placing the child in the care and custody of the non-abusive parent").
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The statute, however, is not interpreted to mean that the child's custody is
awarded as compensation to the parent who is a victim of domestic violence.
Further, mediators often assume that a parent who has obtained a temporary
restraining order against the co-parent without also naming the child as a
protected party and/or seeking temporary sole custody and/or making a child
abuse report to the Department of Children's Protective Services, does not
really believe that the co-parent presents a danger to the child.'
Hence, a parent trying to use this implicit nexus test to obtain a more
favorable custody allocation faces an uphill battle. Significantly, the mediators
in the audiotaped sessions neither assume nor presume this connection. Rather,
it is completely up to the parent to "make the case" for any limitations or
restrictions on the other parent's visitation or custody rights as a consequence
of domestic violence.
The second approach provides an indirect or backdoor route to limiting a
co-parent's custodial allocation. There is a rule-one of policy at the time
these sessions were transcribed and shortly thereafter codified and mandated 6 7-that when either one or both parents are subject to restraining orders,
the parenting plan must specify strict schedules for the time that the child will
spend with each parent and state precisely the dates and times of the child's
transfer. The problems involved in working out the strict scheduling,
especially for parents whose occupations and lifestyles require temporal
flexibility, may result in significant de facto limitations on parenting time and
parental contact-accomplishing indirectly what the mediators will not directly
propose as an option in the absence of a strong nexus test. Again, the practice
of making agreements with strict schedules in the presence of protective orders
provides an opportunity for successful strategizing on the part of skillful

66. Under Los Angeles County Superior Court policy, no child custody case can be mediated
where there is an ongoing investigation or open file regarding possible child abuse by one of the
parents. Mediators are "mandated reporters" of child abuse and must report their knowledge of
it to state authorities. All parents are advised at the beginning of child custody mediation that this
is one of a few situations not covered by the confidentiality provisions. During a session, if a
mediator suspects child abuse or neglect, the mediator has discretion to suspend the mediation.

CAL. R. CT. APP. Div. 126(f)(2).
67. Section 3031(b) of the California Code states in pertinent part:
Whenever custody or visitation is granted to a parent in a case in which domestic
violence is alleged and an emergency protective order, protective order, or other
restraining order has been issued, the custody or visitation order shall specify the time,
day, place, and manner of transfer of the child for custody or visitation to limit the
child's exposure to potential domestic conflict or violence and to ensure the safety of
all family members.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3031(b) (West Supp. 1996). Section 6323(b) contains an identical provision
regarding temporary custody and visitation orders issued in conjunction with ex parte temporary
restraining orders. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6323(b) (West Supp. 1996).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss3/2

28

Kandel: Squabbling in the Shadows: What the Law Can Learn from the Way Di

19971

SQUABBLING IN THE SHADOWS

victims-as "protections" for victims are reformulated by their users into
parental rights and entitlements.
The third approach argues that because stability and status quo are so
important to a child's well-being and adjustment, the parent with the more
stable residential situation should have the majority of custodial time. It is a
virtual axiom of child custody law that, all other things being equal, the best
custodial placement requires maintenance of the status quo.6" While this
policy almost always gives the parent with de facto primary custody an
advantage, that advantage can be considerably amplified for a parent who
holds a restraining order against the co-parent that prohibits coming to or
calling the house (even where the restraining order does not also award
temporary custody). The parent holding the protective order can argue both
that the child is well-adjusted to a stable primary home and that the maintenance of that very stability requires that the co-parent's access and visitation
be strictly limited and scheduled.
B. "This Is My House; This Is My Son:" The Case of David and Shoshanna
David and Shoshanna's mediation session takes place the morning after the
argument discussed in Part II (A) above. Shoshanna has spent the night in a
motel. She has still not seen Josh. David has kept Josh out of daycare, taking
him instead to his own mother's house.69 Shoshanna comes to mediation with

68. See, e.g., Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 493 (Cal. 1986); In re Marriage of Carney,
598 P.2d 36, 38 (Cal. 1979); In re Stephanie M., 867 P.2d 706, 716 (Cal. 1994). Stability and
status quo are axioms of custody law often taken for granted; however, such axioms are often
assumed, rather than stated, in decisions. As such, no handful of case citations can do justice to
the importance of such axioms in custody practice. A more accurate assessment of the significance of these principles can be gained from the statements in a popular California practice guide,
authored mostly by present and former California family law judges. "Generally, courts are
reluctant to upset the custodial arrangement in existence prior to the hearing (particularly in
regard to young children); quite the contrary, absent a showing of detriment to the child, courts
will favor maintenance of the status quo." William P. Hogoboom & Donald B. King,
CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE FAMILY LAW 7-47 (student ed. 1995). "Although not reduced to
express statutory terms, a primary component of the 'best interests' rule is the goal of protecting
a stable custody arrangement. When a particular type of custody has continued over a significant
period, the child's need for stability and continuity assumes an increasingly importantrole, and
the need will often dictate the conclusion that it is in the child's best interests to maintain the
current arrangement." Id. at 7-79.
69. David explains,
[L]ast night we were, we were hanging out together this morning, I, y'know, took him
to my mother's house there, 'cause it was too late to, to go to the, the daycare, and we
didn't know when we could be coming back, and, and he's a little sick, so my mother
would take better care of him, um, today, anyway.
Shoshanna and David's mother are wary, jealous, and suspicious of one another. David's mother,
naturally siding with her son in the divorce, has written an affidavit saying that Shoshanna is "an
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an immediate custodial concern that is uppermost on her mind-to reunite with
Josh and bring him back under her temporary physical custody. 0 Shoshanna
chooses not to mediate in a face-to-face joint session with David but does meet
with him toward the very end of the session. The mediator acts as go-between,
and Shoshanna must be articulate enough to get the mediator to present to
David the issues that are most important to her. The following paragraphs
examine Shoshanna's conversation with the mediator and ponder whether this
forum assists her in getting more custody "mileage" from the protective order.
The mediator questions Shoshanna in several ways about the possible nexus
between David's violence towards her and his relationship to Josh. She first
asks about any possible direct consequences to Josh from having witnessed
domestic violence. But Shoshanna concedes that there has been no physical
violence and alleges no extraordinary effects on Josh.
Mediator: Now, one of the things that I'm concerned about is whether or not
any of this um .... has there been any violence in front of the child?
Shoshanna: Um, not that he hit me, but many times he yells at me in front
of the child. Many times.
Mediator: And what happens to your son?
Shoshanna: He start[s] crying.
Shoshanna does not elaborate on her answers, and the mediator does not
press the point. To the mediator, who listens to numerous divorce stories each
week, yelling and crying seem to be only the normal and temporary side
effects of divorce. Shoshanna volunteers nothing further, so the mediator
proceeds to ask about more indirect and speculative effects, such as the kind
of co-parental relationship Shoshanna is likely to have with David in the
future. Without flagging the issue, the mediator is providing Shoshanna with
a window of opportunity to use the abuse nexus test to advance her arguments
for custody. 7'

immature and impatient person" who could not nurse the baby because she was too impatient.
For Shoshanna, visiting Josh at David's mother's house is a practical and emotional impossibility.
70. Although no temporary order giving David custody of Josh has been issued with the
protective order in this case, it is evident that David's having sole possession of the house gives
him interim de facto custody of Josh. Shoshanna is scared to return to the house by herself,
despite her legal entitlement to do so. She explains, "I, y'know, I called the police today, I said,
'Please if I need

. .

. 'I need to take few things from the house.'

. ..

[My attorney] told me,

y'know, try not to, just, y'know, if you need some things, go over there and take it, y'know?
And I also called my aunt, and I told her, 'Please come t-today, y'know, be with me today,
please.'"
71. It is of some significance that this particular mediator phrases the issue of the effects of
domestic violence in such an impartial way. The mediator for this session had some particular
expertise in the handling of domestic violence issues; was among tose most concerned about the
mediation of cases involving domestic violence; and mentioned to me during an informal
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss3/2
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Mediator: [O]ne of the things that would be important for you to help me
understand is, can this dad, does he have potential? I mean, obviously, you

want, you, you're saying you want custody, but we have to figure something
out. If he's a danger to this child, or if he has been very, um, inappropriate
in front of the child and you think he's going to continue to do that kind of
thing, that's one thing. But assuming you're going to get over all of this and

that the relationship will somehow stabilize, where each of you get on with
your life, I'-I'd like to get a feel from you if that is what you think is going

to happen, or whether or not you think there's going to be a continuation of
some domestic violence issues. In other words, it sounds like he's been a
kind of a controlling person to you. But do you think that once the divorce
is over with, that the two of you will be able to establish a good parenting

relationship?
Shoshanna takes no advantage of this opportunity. She responds commonsensically.
Shoshanna: David, he, there is no reason that he will be, urn, domestic,
y'know, uh, like, violence toward me, because I won't be around, O.K.?

Whether because of reticence, honesty, subordination, or lack of the ability
to articulately tie together her underlying concerns with the issues raised and
tactics implied in the mediator's questions, Shoshanna does not use the
restraining order as a basis for trying to limit David's contact with Josh.
Instead of expressing concern to the mediator that David's violent propensities72 may be harmful to Josh, Shoshanna shares her anxiety that David may
win sole custody and that this will be tantamount to a de facto custody award
to David's mother. But Shoshanna's distrust of David's mother and sense of
having been betrayed by her does not trigger any special concern from the
mediator about Josh's well-being. Shoshanna's big concern is that she, not

interview that one of the problems with Los Angeles court sponsored mediation was the lack of
time for the slow and sensitive case handling that cases involving domestic violence require. This
mediator also habitually read the case records, with their detailing of protective orders and
domestic violence allegations, more closely than the majority of mediators. If anything, this
mediator would have been more likely than most to "red flag" the implications of domestic
violence for custody and visitation.
72. The only physical violence by David that is mentioned during the mediation session occurs
towards a third party in the interest of protecting Shoshanna. The mediator, having read about
it in the declaration in the file, brings up the issue of David "being violent with a young man who
accidentally ran into him in his Chrysler." Shoshanna explains "Well, y'know ... he denied it
on, on the... courthouse, a-and he said that I was bleeding. I was bleeding... right? But I
was . . . constantly telling David, 'David please stop. Come on, let him go already, OK?' ...
I said 'Stop' . . . But, so he told, uh, the judge that ... he was scared, he was scared when he
saw me bleeding. So this is the reason he got really violent. But I told David, 'David, stop!'
Y'know, 'Stop hitting the guy in already.'"
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David's mother, should be Josh's primary caretaker, both immediately and
permanently.
Shoshanna: I'm just saying that uh, the funny thing is, every time when I
had to go, or, y'know, my mother came over, and we had to go to Las
Vegas, he said, "OK, I'm watching Josh. Finally, I'm gonna watch Josh,
and you won't be home." So I came home, his mother was sleeping
overnight over there, bathing Josh, feeding Josh... [He, I mean, ...
yesterday, even, when he came out of the house, told me, "My mother is on
her way. She will take care of him." . . . [lo tell the truth, that they would
have co-, she will, he will have custody, but I know what will happen in that
custody: she will move over there, and she will take care of Josh.... OK?
But as, as [far as] David's concerned, sh-his mother can move over there,
and she will bathe him and feed him, and he can sit over there, and when
Josh is done and clean and, and he can play with him. He wanna have the
fun parts, that's it. So he can have the fu-fun parts, and, and so I will

congratulate him, have him on the weekend and, and fun, fun part.
Shoshanna's wish to have Josh returned to her immediate physical custody
is sensible in light of the fact that she has been Josh's primary caretaker since
birth. But, unlinked to the domestic violence issues, Shoshanna fails to convey
her request for Josh's immediate return with the sense of urgency that would
induce the mediator to be her avid spokesperson in this shuttle diplomacy style
mediation, as the following dialogue, which takes place at the end of
Shoshanna's separate session, shows. Without the shadow of danger,
Shoshanna's plea seems scarcely more than a whining wish to remove a child
from a loving grandmother who is babysitting.
Shoshanna: Just ask him, please, I wou-, I would like to go and get Josh.
Y'know, I-I bet his mother is watching him. And...
Mediator: [interrupting] OK. I think you...
Shoshanna: [overlapping with the mediator's speech] Tell him...
Mediator: [overlapping with Shoshanna's speech] Really ought to talk to
your attorney about that.... As a mediator, it's not my role to advise him
to give the child back to you one way or the other. Until there's a court
order, you're both parents.'
73. This is, of course, the correct statement of the law. Parents have equal and alternative
rights to care and custody of the child until there is an agreement or order to the contrary.
Mediators must give this answer when parents ask about their rights. For example, the following
dialogue took place in a different case:
Craig: Legally, urn, I meant to ask a question... Legally, um... I'm authorized to
see my son correct? I'm allowed to see my son at any time?
Mediator: Well, until there's a separation, you're considered a legally married couple.
OK. So there's nothing saying "Yes" and there is nothing saying "No." It's just as
though you were still married and living in the same house until somebody files somehttps://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss3/2
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Shoshanna does not get from the mediation session what she seems to most
poignantly want-an immediate reunification with Josh. David refuses to
transfer Josh to Shoshanna's physical custody until she has a permanent place
to live.
David: She's floating now. I don't even know where she stayed last night;
she won't tell me, whether she stayed at her aunt's or, or I think her piano
teacher's. While she's floating, I don't want him living with her. Until she
finds a house that she, or ... a residence.... That means ... a good...
and, y'know, furniture moved in.... Josh should live with me. I don't

think he should be going house to house, or ... location to location like a
gypsy.
Not surprisingly, considering the emphasis the law places on stability and
status quo in determining the child's best interests,74 the mediator does not
question this suggestion. But Shoshanna has now been doubly victimized by
David. She is "floating" 75 like a "gypsy" now (as David puts it) only because
David has pushed her out of the family home. Once again, David avails
himself of the legal discourse of bodies and spaces. Turning her own
involuntary banishment against her, he argues that her unstable residential
situation makes her, at least for the present, an inappropriate custodian.76

thing.
Although mediators must, perforce, adopt this position as the baseline, it does not prevent
them from frequently and persistently presenting and recommending alternative options, which
the mediator in David and Shoshanna's case, did not do.

74. See supra note 66.
75. "Watery" words, used metaphorically, such as "stream," "tide," and "flood," attach in
contemporary American English to undesireables, in contrast, for example, to good citizens who
are "rooted" in the community. See Lisa Malkki, NationalGeographic:The Rooting of Peoples

and The Territorializationof National Identity Among Scholars and Refugees, 7 CuLTURAL
ANTHRO. 24,33 (1992) (stating that "[o]ursedentarist assumptions about attachment to place lead
us to define displacement not as a fact about sociopolitical context, both rather as an inner,
pathological condition of the displaced").
76. During the separate session with David, the mediator presents Shoshanna's proposal for
a long range custody arrangement. Shoshanna has proposed a parenting plan in which she has
primary physical custody and David has one weekend overnight each week and one weekday
overnight on the evening that Shoshanna takes English lessons. This custodial arrangement is
actually more favorable to David than the usual plan for a child Josh's age developed in the
conciliation court. While the weekend, midweek overnight pattern is quite typical, mediators
usually and actively advise against overnights for children younger than two and a half. The
mediator considers the overnight visit in this case to be appropriate because Josh is, at that very
moment, staying overnight alone with David as Shoshanna indicates he has done before. At first,
David agrees to this plan with surprising readiness, but it is disrupted when Shoshanna's attorney
comes in to review the agreement. The attorney says that Shoshanna needs money to find a place
to live. When David makes an offer, the attorney first tells David that he has not offered enough,
and then, when David asks for a counter-offer, the attorney tells him that money should not be
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If Shoshanna were more knowledgeable in the substantive categories and
values of the law of custody, she could have made a stronger case for herself,
perhaps winning over the mediator as an ally. The law understands stability
and status quo as referring not merely to the place of care but also to the
continuity of care with the primary caretaker.' Since Shoshanna has been the
primary caretaker, she might have been able to make a stronger argument that
David's being the interim primary caretaker would be destabilizing for Josh.
But her chatter about David's mother's extensive caretaking and ubiquitous
presence excludes this approach. Shoshanna does not succeed in either
informal forum in bringing Josh back into her family circle or in creating her
protected privacy zone. At least until the court hearing, Shoshanna remains a
disempowered outsider.
C. "Safefrom Screaming:" The Case of John and Laura
John and Laura's mediation takes place in a combination of face-to-face
and separate sessions about two months after the incident described in Part II
(B) above. Unlike Shoshanna, Laura is able to use her story about the fight
and her subsequent temporary restraining order to significantly enhance her
custody position. Under the earlier agreement, which is legally in place at the
time the session opens, although not strictly followed by the parties, John has
weekend visitation on alternate weekends and midweek visitation on Wednesday afternoons and evenings. At the conclusion of the mediation session, a
new agreement is signed that reduces John's visitation for the next three
months to three hours in the afternoon on alternate Saturdays or Sundays and
deprives him of a subsequent visitation if he fails to appear without having
timely called to cancel."

discussed during mediation. This game playing angers David who declares, "[A]II bets are off,
and we're going to court tomorrow morning." The mediator begs David to resume negotiations,
urging him to act like an adult and separate the child's needs from his own, but she cannot
convince him and lacks legal authority to compel him. David leaves.
77. "Custodial stability, continuity and a loving parent-child relationship have been classified
as the most important criteriafor determining the child's best interests. Courts are reluctant to
disrupt establishedpatterns of care and emotional bonds except for very compelling reasons."
William P. Hogoboom & Donald B. King, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE FAMILY LAW 7-97
(student ed. 1995).
78. John repeatedly says that he is only agreeing to the change in scheduling and the cessation
of overnights on an interim basis until he knows whether and where he is working, until he has
suitable living space, and until Laura has calmed down. At the end of the session, the couple
schedules an appointment to review the agreement three months in the future. However, the
agreement includes only a clause stipulating that the agreement will be reviewed, not a sunset
provision. If Laura does not cooperate in coming to the second appointment, John may have to
serve Laura with a custody petition to get her to reconsider.
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Laura's singular achievement is that she is able, in essence, to reinterpret
the implicit nexus test and convince the mediator to align with her position that
there is a need to regulate and control John's visitation. Laura succeeds in this
task even though the violence between John and Laura is mutual and even
though she admits that her motivations towards John are partly punitive.79
Further, as John states without contradiction by Laura: "[1]n the four years
that I've had them, they've never so much as gotten a scratch." Both parents
agree, also, that the children are enthusiastic. about spending time with
John."
The argument through which Laura brings the domestic violence issue
within the concerns of the implicit nexus test is conceptually simple. It is the
link of fear. She says, and repeats at different points in the session, that the
children are frightened when she and John fight.
Laura: Mhe children are very scared.... The children are scared, y'know,
they say, 'Oh Mommy, y'know, we don't like Daddy anymore; he hurts
Mommy.'.. . But they're scared.... They were feeling scared, and I

79. In explaining to the mediator why she wants the agreement to state that if John fails to
exercise his visitation without formally canceling it, he forfeits his next visitation, Laura tells the
mediator, "I have never been able to enforce anything with him, he- there were never
consequences. Every single time I file a police repori, he goes, 'Well, you're the one who's
going to be wasting your time in court, not me. I get bailed out; I get a public defender, and
you're the one who has to pay attorneys' fees.' And the whole thing, and I go, like, uh-and
never has ever happened, I mean, I never got, he's never been punished if you wanna put it that
way."
80. Laura: [IThey have asked about him.., and they want to see him, 'cause he's their dad,
and they can't forget about him, just, y'know in two months ... I don't want to say they
couldn't care less if they never saw him again.
In fact, Laura both concedes and resents the extent to which the children enjoy staying with
John.
Laura: And the weekends the same thing. This is very typical. I made my plans for the kids,
and he will call the kids and say, 'Do you want to come with Dad?' And of course they want to
go with Dad, so my plans get, like, all y'know, thrown away ... They usually have a good time
with him. I'm the one who's uptight about it because...
John: Usually they don't wanna go home.
Laura: Yeah, of course not! I mean, they love you, I mean, they're your kids. I'm
not ...
John: Yeah, but I'm also active with them. Y'know, with the Superbowl, I'm, I'm at
the park with my son, y'know.
Laura: [interrupting] Absolutely
Mediator: Well, that's ...
Laura: Right, I-here is the parent who has to work, y'know, 60-70 hours a week to support
them to give them what they want and need. He doesn't do that. So he can play with them. I
work too many hours, you know. I try to give them as much as I can, but I - I know it's not
enough. But I-I'm the breadwinner in this family. Y'know, I have to put them through college.
So, I, y'know, what can I say? I am, uh, I'm guilty of that. I'll say that. So, fine, so they don't
wanna come home.
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[Tihe children are all scared and
everything.... I mean I can get killed by a car tomorrow, and I don't
know what would happen to my children, but they're scared for me, so I'm
afraid that [if] he hurts me, I'm out of a job .... I can't support my
children, and who's gonna take care of them?
don't want anything like that....

The fear that Laura speaks of neither constitutes a risk that John might
abuse the children nor does it, on these facts, evidence serious psychological
or emotional harm to the children. But Laura, a good pro se advocate, brings
her concerns within the spirit, if not the letter, of the implicit nexus test and
wins the mediator's alliance.
Mediator: [to Laura] I think it's important for you all to feel safe, and
[there's]

. .

. also laws so that the kids can feel safe.

Mediator: [to John] [IUt's important that... everybody feels like, y'know,
that during the time when they meet there aren't going to be any problems,
people aren't going to be screaming and yelling at each other; y'know,
maybe the two of you haven't been physically y'know violent for a long time
except for this one incident, now, but if people are screaming and yelling at
each other, y'know, these kids are watching all of that ... and I don't know
what the kids are gonna feel, but as long as the kids feel safe, that's really
the most important.
But why is Laura more convincing than Shoshanna? After all, it is not selfevident that Laura and John's children should be more frightened by such
scenes than David and Shoshanna's son. Laura's ability to get the mediator to
align with her is a function of both Laura's good rationale for her position and
her furthering that rationale with rhetorical skill. In comparison with
Shoshanna, who briefly touches on the "yelling" and "crying" and then moves
on to concerns about her mother-in-law, Laura insistently harps on the
children's "fear" until the mediator begins to associate "fear" with yelling and
screaming. Laura's rhetorical skills also far surpass John's, in ways perhaps
related to the psychodynamics of their relationship."1

81. The academic debate over how language, gender, and power are related, and what this
implies in legal contexts, has been a longstanding one. See, e.g., ROBIN LAKOFF, LANGUAGE
AND WOMEN'S PLACE (1975) (defining certain characteristics of women's speech as indicating
and substantiating sexual subordination); WILLIAM M. O'BARR, LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE:
LANGUAGE, POWER, AND STRATEGY IN THE COURTROOM (1982) (looking for Lakoff's speech
characteristics in legal settings and finding them to be indices more of powerlessness than
gender); GENDER ARTICULATED: LANGUAGE AND THE SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTED SELF 1 (Kira

Hall & Mary Bucholtz, eds., 1995); Susan Gal, Language, Gender,and Power:AnAnthropologicalReview in GENDER ARTICULATED: LANGUAGE AND THE SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTED SELF 169
(Kira Hall & Mary Bucholtz, eds., 1995) (reviewing and critiquing the current state ofknowledge
on the subject). The cases discussed above suggest that powerful-understood as convincing-speech is correlated more with situational and contextualized interpersonal power, at least
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Laura is organized.I From the very first joint meeting with the mediator
she proposes a concise plan including the drastically reduced visitation time.
Laura uses concise stories of recent events to emphasize her points. John, on
the other hand, rambles and rationalizes present circumstances with lengthy
accounts of the relationship's ancient history. Laura makes skillful use of
reported speech (having the children make their own case as characters in her
stories), implying causality through juxtaposition and other techniques, while
John bumbles about-sometimes not even finishing his sentences. At this level
of generality, rhetorical skill and power of personality seem inextricably
intertwined. Laura succeeds not only because she speaks well but also because
she continues speaking and insists on advancing her position. John loses not
only because he does not speak well (a lack of talent which may be at least
partially induced by his subordinate position) but also because he gives in too
readily and fails to address himself directly to the subject on the table. Thus,
Laura and John's respective approaches during the mediation session itself
seem to parallel, on a verbal level, their behavioral strategies (John's
avoidance and Laura's assertiveness) after the fight in Laura's house.
Against the background of the children's fear, it is easy to get the mediator
to focus on the importance of a rigid schedule. The aim becomes making the
children feel safe (and not merely to keeping John and Laura from fighting).
Thus, Laura has a relatively easy task in achieving an agreement that
significantly limits the quantity and timing of John's visitation with the
children. Laura needs only to support her desires by reference to the family's
weekly schedule of school, work, shopping, and karate lessons. Eventually it
appears as though the few brief hours on Saturday or Sunday afternoon are the
only place where John's annoying visit can fit.
Laura: I am on a schedule... So, and the children are used to my
schedule, so I think it would be best for everything.... I pick the time on
Saturdays, every other Saturday between, like 2:00 and 5:30.... So he can
have the afternoon. I'm willing, you know, if he wants more time with
them, but, uh, on Saturdays my children have a karate class, and they're not
free until, like 12:30, so that's why I figure 2:00 .... I work full-time, I
leave my house at 6:30 in the morning. with the children .... [I] don't pick
them up until 6:00 or 6:30 and have to have them in bed by 8:30, do homework... and get up... and do the... same thing, the, the next day.
And sometimes I work on Saturdays .... And I always get a sitter, but he
always says, 'Well, maybe I can watch them, maybe, maybe.' So to me, the
schedule is important because I can schedule my time ... and then, just my

in the mediation context, than with gender or other broad factors.
82. For example, she comes to the mediation session with supporting documentation. "Ihave
all my papers here. I have all the police reports."
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week and my Saturday[, ...just to do my grocery shopping around that,
and the children also feel more comfortable when they know what they're
doing. It's hard for them to go to school on Wednesdays, 'Is my dad gonna
pick me up?' and I go, 'I don't know, honey. If he doesn't, I'll be there.
And he always lets me know, like, at 5:00, when, like, I have to drop
everything and leave my office to run over to the suburbs to pick up my
children at 6:00.... So for that reason, I need a schedule .... I don't want
[the Wednesday] anymore; it's too difficult for us, uh, y'know.
John feebly opposes this plan, repeatedly trying to explain that his present
work schedule (or lack thereof) makes strict scheduling burdensome, if not
impossible, and requesting a two week adjournment until he knows whether
he will get the job he is currently seeking.
John: Well, y'know, I, I lost my job because I didn't ... I was off, and it
was commission sales, and they don't wait around, and I haven't been
employed since, and uh, uh, I interviewed for several positions and the hours
are always different, and sometimes it's the weekends, sometimes it's nights,
some are 9:00 to 5:00, and nothing is set yet .... [After rambling on
through twenty minutes of talk, John is finally able to say] I'd like to be
able, like I told you, to, uh, uh ... I assume within the next two weeks I'll
be working, and when I know a schedule, to work it out.
Further, at least in part because of Laura's high-strung intrusions,83 John
has had to leave his ideal residence "setup" with "a guy who did children's
parties,"' and move temporarily into a "very small place" where "there's
no, really, cooking facilities or whatsoever."' All this makes overnight
visitation difficult. And Laura, like David, uses John's temporary housing

conditions as a legalistic rationale for limiting John's visitation with the
children because, "He really has no place to take them."
John's style of speaking and his unfinished sentences fail to make his case.
He loses sight of the specifics at issue as his requests for flexibility get tangled
up in his explanations about his work predicament. Again and again, he states,
almost as a wishful thought, that Laura's proposal is acceptable to him because
Laura has said she would be flexible. In fact, during the session, Laura has

83. John explains, "Anyway, uh, so she accused me of being on drugs to take the kids, and
I said 'I'm not, y'know, and uh, and uh, y'know, my son wants to stay overnight. And so she
calls the police, the police come and search the house at the time we weren't there. My roommate
got very upset, he asked me to move, he said, 'I don't want the police coming into my house for
you and your ex's prbblems.'"
84. John: And where I was living, I lived-my roommate, uh, he did children's parties. Very
successful. I like this, I even took my kid, my kid met Meryl Streep and got her autograph on
a baseball, Tom Hanks, the magic.
85. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
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repeated that she must have a rigid and specific schedule. In the process of
rejecting the very idea of scheduling, John seems to lose sight of the very
reduced quantity of time he will receive under Laura's proposed arrangement.86 Above and beyond his inarticulateness, in arguing for a flexible
schedule John has an uphill task. He is espousing a position that the law
disfavors. Moreover, with regard to the laws and policies of California,
Laura's concerns fit hand-in-glove with an accepted position.
Laura's rhetorical strength (her dramatic style, consistency, and persistence) and the wisdom which lead her to ask for things (such as strict
schedules) that custody law and mediation practice favor convince the mediator
that a strictly scheduled agreement is the best one for these parents. Laura's
approach also makes the mediator aware that there is no room for compromise
on these issues and that no other type of agreement is likely. Accordingly,
when the mediator begins the separate session with John, he is already at a
disadvantage. The mediator, concerned with filling in the substance of a strict
schedule, repeatedly asks John what days and times he would prefer. But John
keeps pleading for flexibility so that John and the mediator talk for some time
at cross-purposes.
The mediator, whose style is more supportive than proactive, does not
suggest any time plans to John; rather, she keeps trying to get him to suggest
something.' But John, whose responses to Laura (as we have seen) are

86. Mediator: What about the time issue? Is that acceptable to you?
John: [interrupting] 2:00 to 5:30, I mean, w-she said she'd be somewhat flexible there,
so I mean, I think we can, uh...
Laura: On Saturdays, or do you want Sundays?
John: Well, that's a question where it's hard to say. This last job I applied for, I went
for three interviews, I was going to work all day Saturday from 9:00 to 6:00.
Laura: So maybe you want Sunday.
John: My third interview, I-I didn't get it, you know, if it's...
Laura: [interrupting] What I want to make sure is that we do get a schedule here, [if]
he's gonna call them or see them...
John: Yeah...
Laura: I don't wanna leave it up in the air.
Mediator: I think you may, I think you do need one. That's, that's what we'll look
at... 2:00 to 5:30 either day?
John [to Laura]: You said you might be a little bit flexible, if we have a plan, or
somewhere to go, something to do, I can talk...
Laura: [interrupting] Yeah, but I want it to be on paper, so that we can say these are
the times. Whatever it is you want, you want-them from 10:00, 11:00, 8:00 until 3:00,
5:00 you just tell her....
John: Like I say, [2:00 to 5:30 on Saturdays is] flexible, as long as, y'know, if you're
willing to talk, if there's somewhere they're gonna go...
Laura: [interrupting] That's what we're trying to, No. I want a time here.
87. A considerable controversy exists in the mediation literature between such a directive,
problem-focused, style of mediation and a less directive self-determining style. CompareJOSEPH
FOLBERG & ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION (1994) and ROBERT A.
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basically reactive, is unable to come up with a specific counterproposal and
instead keeps trying to get someone to understand his job situation.
Mediator: Now, the other times are OK? The alternate Saturdays?
John: Well, ....
Mediator: Or, she said all day Sunday is fine.
John: [interrupting] Yeah, I mean, if she-she's flexible there .... I'm still
waiting, um, I don't think the one position the guy hired a relative, I went
down to meet the owner my third interview, uh, I was going to work all day
Saturdays, and I went down, just assumed I was gonna be hired, and they,
they said, uh, they hired a nephew or something, so I think I'm out of luck
on one job and, uh, y'know, I don't know, I mean ... I just want to be
able to see 'em, and uh, maybe like to come back in, uh, three months, and
uh, maybe see how she feels. I mean, this whole thing, in essence is, is, uh,
this hasn't done me a lot of good.
Finally, the mediator seizes upon John's one specific proposal, that the
agreement be only for a three month period, and gives it her backing,
presenting it to Laura as the mediator's own idea (perhaps to make it more
acceptable): "One thought that I had was, we could make this agreement
temporary and come back in three or four months to review it and see how
things are going." Thus, John's one specific request does in fact become part
of the agreement, although given the law's preference for existing custody
arrangements and John's reluctance to take the initiative, it is unclear whether
making the agreement reviewable after several months will actually help John
in getting more time with his children.
As this passage reveals, John's behavior, both at the mediation session and
outside of it, continues to be one of retreating from Laura's emotional
outbursts and letting Laura call the shots while he waits in the shadows. In the
end, John signs an agreement that gives Laura almost everything she wants.
Laura, on the other hand, has consistently used her status as an empowered
victim to make her version of the facts fit the law and mediation principles.
Moreover, Laura uses her position to fortify the ring of power around her,
which includes her house and the couple's children.

BARucii BusH, Efficiency and Protection, or Empowerment and Recognition?: The Mediator's
Role and EthicalStandardsin Mediation, 41 FLA. L. REv. 253, 263 (1989) (espousing a form
of self-determinative mediation the authors call "transformative" in which the mediator's goal is
not to help people solve problems but to transform them through empowerment and recognition
of the needs of others) with George Ferrick, Three CriticalQuestions, 13 MEDIATION Q. 61
(1986) (recommending a task focused approach). In the spring of 1996, the author attended an
informal meeting at the home of one of the Los Angeles County mediators. Several conciliation
court mediators, as well as mediators from outside the court system attended, and the various
pros and cons of problem focused and self-determination focused mediation were discussed and
debated for several hours, with a great range of options and opinions being expressed.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss3/2
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Throughout a session like John and Laura's, a mediator must give due
heed to certain legal constraints. The best interest of the child is particularly
important. Courts interpret this standard as calling for, among other things, a
stable, tranquil home and, in the context of protective orders, specified
schedules for transfer between the parents' homes, even if such a routine
disadvantages one parent. The parent who controls the children within the
protected zone of the family home enters mediation with a legal, de facto
advantage. The parent who speaks to the factors that mediators habitually
associate with a child's best interests, as Laura does but Shoshanna does not,
gains an additional conversational advantage.
D. "Bruises and Bumps:" The Case of Craig and Alicia
Craig and Alicia's case is presented here because it contrasts with the two
preceding cases in two important ways. First, there appears to be no
significant disparity in interpersonal power between Craig and Alicia.
Although the couple has a long history of domestic violence and each has
taken legal action against the other (Alicia has had Craig "jailed" and Craig
has obtained a protective order), they exhibit equal rhetorical skills and seem
to relish arguing with one another."8 Second, Craig and Alicia's arguments
do not fit under the three approaches discussed above and/or are inconsistent
with the mediator's general ideas of the child's best interests. The mediator
facilitating the session is relatively directive in proposing alternatives, and the

88. At the beginning of the session they even argue about who will have the first turn in
talking:
Mediator: You'll both have a chance to talk. It doesn't matter who goes first. Ijust want to
know what each of you would like to do.
Alicia [to Craig]: You can go first.
Craig [to Alicia]: Why don't you go first?
Mediator: Shall we flip a coin? We'll flip a coin. Call it heads or tails.
At the conclusion of the session they argue the same way over the time of transfer of the child
on Thanksgiving day:
Mediator: All Right. Thanksgiving from 9:00 to what ...2:30?
Craig: Yeah.
Alicia: 2:00.
Craig: 2:30.
Alicia: 2:00.
Mediator: Oh, come onl!!
Craig: At Easter it'll be at 3:00.
Alicia: No, 2:00! . ..
Mediator: ... [W]hat do you want to do?

Craig: 2:30.
Alicia: 2:15! 2:15!
Mediator: All right. Do you want to say 2:15? All right. Thanksgiving from 9:30 to 2:15.
It's going to be very obvious that was a compromise. I mean, that's a bizarre time.
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result is that neither parent gets what he or she wants. The final agreement is
a compromise arrangement proposed by the mediator.
Craig and Alicia, who have been separated for three weeks at the time of
mediation, have an eighteen month old son, Ben. Both Craig and Alicia tell
the mediator of Craig's history of violence towards Alicia (although Craig
denies the most recent assault alleged by Alicia).
Craig:... We weren't married at the time and she was living at my
mother's house and it was one night. I came home and she was there and my
parents had jumped on me for her not helping out around the house. So, I
went into the living room to smoke myself a cigarette, and she just kept on
harping and harping and kicking me in the feet. And I told her, 'If you don't
leave me alone, I'm going to hit you.' Well, she kept it up and kept it up for
about five minutes. Well, a person can only take so much. So I stood up and
I broke her leg. OK. And then from there, that was it. And, un ... I said
I was very sorry and I didn't mean to do it, but anger took over.
Alicia: You know the one time that he hit me when I was pregnant, he was
high on cocaine and he was drunk, and it's like two drugs when they mix,
and everything .... [Ie's even hit me when I had the baby in my arms.
He even hit me then.... Yeah, this was like the fourth time he hit me....
And it's like ... he hit me on the 31st and I called the police.
Craig also alleges that Alicia has been violent towards him, which she
denies.
Craig: Nothing like waking up with a knife to your throat .... We got into
a big argument one day and I'm in the living room asleep .... And when
a woman tends to hover over your body, and stomp on
your... (hesitates)... manhood? ... Yeah, that ... that very much
hurts. Or, pulling a knife.... That went on through the whole marriage.
Both Craig and Alicia have taken action to protect themselves from
domestic violence. Alicia has recently had Craig put in jail. Craig denies any
incident and out of self-defense and retaliation obtains a protective order
himself.
Alicia: And then it's like, when he hit me, I was like "You messed up
dude!" He's on probation right now and I was like, "You hit me. How do
you think that's going to go towards your record[?] You're in jail for grand
theft and now for spousal abuse?" I'm like[,J "Come on!" You know, for
assault. I'm like, "Come on!"
Craig: She has put me in jail for spousal abuse. Something that I never
did.... That's why I filed the restraining order, because after she said that
I supposedly hit her, I told her to get the hell out of my fucking house....
And when she was leaving, she goes, "Just - Craig, don't worry about it
'cause you're going to pay with your life." She has made threats to me many
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times with my life.... She's just talking[,] but the way I know her, her
type can turn into something else.... How did she know I went out last
night unless she's trailing me? That's why I'm afraid of her.
The cases of David and Shoshanna and John and Laura illustrate the
tenuous relationship between the actual balance of power between parents and
the technical issue of which parent is the petitioner on a protective order.
Craig and Alicia's case makes this point even more apparent. The case record
(as it would be given to the mediator in this case) would indicate that Craig
holds a protective order against Alicia. Yet, as the dialogue makes clear, this
case is one in which there has been mutual violence and mutual resort to the
law for assistance. There seems a general parity of power. One of the most
important factors in this equality, from the perspective of what the law deems
significant at child custody mediation, is that each parent has a home to share
with the child. Unlike Shoshanna and John who are "floating" and, therefore,
unsuitable custodial bases for their respective children, Alicia, immediately
after being kicked out of the house by Craig, rents an apartment near her
mother (who can help with childcare).
Mediator: [to Alicia] [There] are things you can do to keep yourself
You know there are places called battered women's shelters ....
safe ....
Alicia: Yeah, I know, but I have a place of my own.
This case shows some surprising twists regarding the approaches a parent
can use to limit the co-parent's time with the child. Alicia says she wants
Craig to have monitored visitation s9 and tries to establish some nexus
between the domestic violence and her request. Monitored visitation is
typically awarded only where there is some extreme risk to the child.' Thus,

89. Monitored visitation means that Craig would only be able to visit with the baby in the
presence of a third party.
90. Statutes oblige courts to consider the possibility of supervised visitation in cases involving

protective orders. The California Code states:
When making an order for custody or visitation in a case in which domestic violence
is alleged and an emergency protective order, protective order, or other restraining
order has been issued, the court shall consider whether the best interest of the child,
based upon the circumstances of the case, requires that any custody or visitation
arrangement shall be limited to situations in which a third person, specified by the
court, is present, or whether custody or visitation shall be suspended or denied.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3031(c) (West Supp. 1996). To so seriously curtail the rights of a parent,

however, the courts require a steep evidentiary showing. For example, one provision in the
California Family Code states in pertinent part:
As a prerequisite to the consideration of allegations of abuse, the court may require
substantial independent corroboration, including, but not limited to, written reports by

law enforcement agencies, child protective services or other social welfare agencies,
courts, medical facilities, or other public agencies or private nonprofit organizations
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this requires a steeper showing than making a connection between domestic
violence and strict schedules and limited visitation time, as Laura did in the
previous case. Alicia is unable to meet this threshold, and the mediator
successfully talks her out of her request.
Alicia: To tell you the truth, I just don't think he's a good influence on
him .... He shows the child no discipline. H[e] and his family show the
child no .... I mean they let him run around and they let him do whatever
the heck he wants to. [The mediator tells Alicia that this is an insufficient
reason. After some further probing and prompting by the mediator Alicia
elaborates her narrative.]
Alicia: [F]or a time he was taking care of the baby and it's like, I was like
"Well, how did he get this and how did he get that?" And he said "Oh, he
fell. He fell. Oh, he bumped himself." . . . And it's like, he had bruises on
him and I ask, and it's like "Oh, he fell. Oh, he scraped himself. Oh, he cut
himself." Or "Oh, he was playing with a fork and he stabbed himself or
something." And I'm like "Weren't you watching him?" He said, "Well, I
was watching TV you know, and I got into the program."
But the mediator lets Alicia know that her reasons are still insufficient.
Mediator: Well, look, one of the things I wanted to tell you is there are
times when judges will order third parties present-you know, monitored
visitation .... Um ... generally that's done in cases where there's been
child abuse or sexual abuse or some kind of abuse of the child so that the
child is in danger. So I'm not unsympathetic to what you're saying in terms
of you want somebody there, but what you need to understand is that
judges ... [are] reluctant to order any kind of third party present unless
there's some kind of danger to the child. Like if he had been beating the
child or something, that would be a different story....
Alicia: You know, other than the drugs and the alcohol and because he is a
very abusive person... he has a very violent temper.
Mediator: But he's never abused the child .... I understand what you're
saying but I'm not going to suggest the monitoring .... primarily because
I'm not hearing of any-what we would call "immediate danger" to the
child-as far as danger of abuse. 91

providing services to victims of sexual assault or domestic violence.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011(b) (West 1994). An evidentiary provision of this type virtually
mandates that supervised visitation will be awarded only where a family has already been "caught
up" in the system as a result of violence and abuse, and neutral third party professionals are
prepared to testify about the situation. It also minimizes the likelihood that requests for supervised
visitation will be grounded in allegations of inadequate or inappropriate parenting hurled by one
estranged divorcing parent at the other.
91. In using her idea of what the judge might require to order supervised visitation as a
standard against which to judge the appropriateness of the mediated agreement, the mediator
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss3/2
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Similarly, Craig asks, quite insistently, for overnight visitation. But the
mediator talks him out of it, repeatedly explaining that overnights are regarded
as developmentally inappropriate for children under two.
Mediator: [G]enerally kids of this age don't go overnight. Usually just developmentally, there's a separation problem with-from what we call the
primary caretaking parent.... [U]sually we don't suggest overnights until
the child is maybe two or two and a half or so. It's sometimes hard for them
to be away ... but generally ... generally, a year and a half is a little
young to be starting over-nights ....
Yeah, well, as I said, generally we
don't suggest overnights with a kid this young ....
[Imt's a little young and
sometimes there's a separation problem. You know, the kids become a little
clingy-er and sometimes start having sleeping problems or something like
that. And, again, I'm not saying this has to happen or that he'll be
irreparably scarred for life, but it's generally... it's a little bit young.
Finally, although both parents ask for flexible visitation, the mediator
insistently talks them into a fixed schedule.
Alicia: Well, I don't see what's wrong with me having sole custody of him
and him seeing him whenever he wants to because the child...
Mediator: [interrupting] You mean on a flexible basis? ... But what
happens if, say he wants to see him and you get mad at him or something?
I'm not saying you'd keep the child from him, but generally it seems to
work a little better if there's a structure with it. Now, that doesn't mean that
the two of you, as mature adults, can't, you know, arrange additional
time.... But at least this way, there's verified time that you know you have
and verified time that he knows he has.
Mediator: [to Craig] OK, just tell me what you want.
Craig: Joint custody ....
I could pick him up at my convenience and when
I want to pick him up ....
No schedule.
Mediator: OK. Some families do make arrangements like that. Most families
find that they are better off with some kind of schedule so that each of them
can do some planning and know in advance when the child is going to be
with them ....
What I'm saying though is that especially in cases where
there's a restraining order, judges tend to find that it works better if there's
a very defined schedule, not just, "Well, I'm going to drop him off," or
"Can I see him?" or "Can I pick him up?" Because usually it prevents
arguments if there's a more defined time, so that each of you knows in
advance.

probably has in mind factors such as those announced in CAL. FAM. CODE § 3100 (West. Supp.
1996).
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In sum, Craig and Alicia's case shows a very different combination of
interpersonal powers, protective order dynamics, and the laws and policies
constraining mediation. Craig and Alicia are equally assertive, insistent, and
articulate in stating what they want; they are not afraid to confront one
another; and each can advance the argument of the protective order or of
having been a victim of domestic violence. Yet, neither succeeds in getting
what he or she asks for (even when they both agree) because their requests are
not consistent with the legal norms and values. As a result, their relatively
interventionist mediator convinces them to make a different compromise.
At the same time, Craig and Alicia's case reveals a permutation on the
relationship between personal power and the legal strategies it accomplishes.
Alicia, like Shoshanna and John, has been turned out of the family home when
her estranged spouse drew upon the legal authority of the protective order to
claim sole proprietary rights. Craig's statement, "I told her to get the hell out
of my fucking house" [emphasis added] resonates with the language of Laura's
statement, "This is my house. . . leave my house," and David's, "This is my
house; this is my son." However, unlike Shoshanna who is "floating" or John
who lives in a "very small place" with no real cooking facilities, Alicia has
"a place of [her] own." She has established a stable home, and apparently with
Craig's acquiescence, she has taken the baby with her. Consequently, Craig
(the petitioner on the protective order) has succeeded only in isolating himself.
The mediator seriously discourages his request for flexible access to his son
because, although Alicia concurs with him, California law and mediation
practice deem it inappropriate in the presence of a protective order. Further,
he fails to get the overnight visitation he seeks. The mediator, following
typical Los Angeles county mediation views about what is developmentally
appropriate, maintains that Ben is too young for overnights away from his
primary parent. In contrast, the mediator in David and Shoshanna's case does
not discourage the parents from agreeing to overnights in the long range plan
for Josh, who is also eighteen months old, because to do so would be contrary
to logic. Although Shoshanna is the primary parent, Josh is, at the very
moment of the mediation session, residing with David overnight.
IV. WHAT THE LAW CAN LEARN

It is now possible to answer the question posed at the beginning of this
article: what is the spillover effect of protective orders on child custody? As
we have seen, the substantive law of protective orders and of child custody
concerns the legal protection of vulnerable bodies by assigning them to stable
places. In the first instance, protective orders protect the body of an abused
spouse by creating a safety zone around the abused spouse's person and home
and by making it unlawful for the abuser spouse to cross into that zone (except
for explicitly delimited channels of contact or communication). In the second
instance, laws of child custody strive to place children in stable, tranquil
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss3/2
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homes, and attempt to assure orderly scheduled times and places for transfer
and stay with the non-primary custodial parent. The strong preference for the
stable status quo in custody laws often means that a de facto custodial
arrangement will be confirmed by the court as permanent.
It follows as a matter of legal logic that a parent who takes certain steps
prior to a custody determination can garner a definite advantage. That is if a
parent has exclusive occupancy of the family home, has de facto custody or
primary caretaking responsibility for the child or children living in that family
home, and has been able to safeguard the stability and tranquility of that home
by excluding or limiting the access of the other parent through a protective
order, a favorable custodial allocation becomes more likely. The parent who
is excluded by the protective order is "homeless" and is afforded limited
contact with the child or children. This parent is in a correspondingly
disadvantaged situation.
This link between the securing of safe bodies and stable places through
protective orders and the allocation of children to safe, stable homes seems
perfectly appropriate in what most of us probably imagine as the typical
situation: the primary caretaking parent (usually the mother) as the victim who
has been abused by the non-primary caretaking parent (usually the father)
obtains a protective order controlling the access of her abusive partner and
giving her exclusive control of the house and children. The cases discussed
above demonstrate, however, that real life examples differ from the stereotypical scenario. More complex and nuanced relationships between interpersonal
power and legal power are in fact common. Although pre-existing power
inequalities between the parents in each case seem to play an important role
in the final outcomes, the cases and especially the achievements of Laura and
Alicia do not support the positions of the many feminist writers who assert that
mediation is always inappropriate where there has been a history of domestic
violence. 2 Rather, the relationship between legal and interpersonal power
and domestic violence must be more fully contextualized. Not every victim or
participant in domestic violence is battered; nor is it always the weaker party
who holds the protective order.
In addition, many parents who have protective orders and child custody
disputes do not call directly upon legal authorities such as police or judges.
Rather, parents draw upon the law as a source of self-help, making their own
legalistic arguments when they squabble with each other or availing themselves
of more "user-friendly" legal processes, such as protective order hearings and
court sponsored child custody mediation where parents can represent them-

92. See, e.g., Mary Pat Treuthart, In Hann's Way? Family Mediation and the Role of the
Attorney Advocate, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.717 (1993); Andree G. Gagnon, Note, Ending
Mandatory Divorce Mediation for Battered Women, 15 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 272 (1992);
Germane et. al., supranote 54; Willrich, supra note 54.
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selves. In such circumstances, which party is the petitioner for a protective
order depends more upon strategic predisposition and the division of
interpersonal authority than who is the perceived "victim." Sometimes the
more powerful party is indeed the abusing spouse, and like David, this party
is able to avoid the disciplines and constraints of a protective order. In other
cases, however, the technical victim is the stronger (Laura) or an equal
(Alicia), and it is this party who wields the shield of law to a greater
advantage. The stronger parent in the relationship may manage to make use
of a protective order to control the other parent either by obtaining it (like
Laura) or by interpreting it (like David), even where the stronger parent is the
respondent. It also seems that rhetorical skills and strategies-the ability to
persuasively argue that the law is on one's side-become increasingly
important to what a parent "gets" from having a protective order. The increase
in importance comes as one moves from domestic arguments to mediation and
as rhetorical skill is more positively, but not unambiguously, related to
dominance within the relationship.93
Interpersonal power and legal power manifest themselves as two different
dimensions in these cases. The power relationship can be best understood by
visualizing it within a matrix that has two, crossing axes. The first axis
represents a division in the dimension of interpersonal power. It extends from
one parent to the other and points along the line quantifying each party's
dominance or subordination. The second axis shows the division of legal
power. It defines the balance of power between individuals' freedom to act as
they please and the law's power, not merely to punish wrongdoing but to
induce behavior it considers desirable. This second axis extends from
individuals and individualism to the state and state sanctioned behavioral
forms. And it is along this second axis-in altering the behavior of the parties
towards conformity with legally preferred norms-that protective orders and
the "user friendly" legal process have a profound impact that the cases make
visible. Paradoxically,9" even when the law is used to enhance the power of

93. In addition, a methodological caveat must be recognized here. The dialogues are not
simultaneous accounts of actual happenings in real time as told by an objective observer who
witnessed each relationship's development from its inception. Rather, they are autobiographical
narratives told during mediation and can, thus, only reflect each parent's view of the interparental
power dynamics at the time of mediation. The dialogues cannot tell us 'with any reliability
whether one of these parents, such as Laura or Alicia, was previously transformed, through the
help of a legal remedy such as a protective order, from being the subordinate spouse to being the
stronger one. What the narratives do tell us is that for events occurring within a single slice of
time, interpersonal power dynamics seem to be major determinants of the way protective orders
are interpreted to reconfigure family arrangements. They also shed light on the way rhetorical
skills affect mediation and the way in which parents' wishes are most favored in the parenting
plan agreement.
94. This paradox of legal power has been observed and discussed by many ethnographers.
See, e.g., SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETrING JusTiCE AND GETTING EvEN (1990). In this
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the dominant spouse, it "legalizes" the discourse of the dispute, obliging the
parents to behave in legally acceptable ways (arguing rather than throwing
wine glasses) and to think in legally acceptable categories (such as specific
schedules for child transfer).95
The fascinating process revealed by the data is that protective orders
work-even when they are not "working" as the law anticipates they should.

ethnography of community mediation in working-class New England, Merry explains that a
paradox of power is created when people bring their interpersonal disputes to court-annexed
mediation because in gaining power over their adversaries, parties lose power to the legal
process. Yet, as they adapt to using the law, they acquire a facility with its ways and concepts
that gives them a new means of power and control over their adversaries. See id.
95. This paradoxical capitulation to the legal perspective as a means to maintain interpersonal
power within the relationship instantiates philosopher Michel Foucault's concept of power/knowledge. In the term "power/knowledge," Foucault maintains that certain ways of looking
at the world produce certain kinds of knowledge and that such knowledge, because it determines
the very categories of value and understanding, is power.
We should admit rather that power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging
it because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful); that power and
knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the
correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not
presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations. These 'power-knowledge
relations' are to be analyzed, therefore, not on the basis of a subject of knowledge who
is or is not free in relation to the power system, but, on the contrary, the subject who
knows, the objects to be known and the modalities of knowledge must be regarded as
so many effects of these fundamental implications of power-knowledge and their
historical transformations. In short, it is not the activity of the subject of knowledge that
produces a corpus of knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but power-knowledge,
the processes and struggles that traverse it and of which it is made up, that determines
the forms and possible domains of knowledge.
MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 27-28 (Alan Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 1977)
(1975) [hereinafter DISCIPLINE]; see MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE (Colin Gordon
ed., Gordon et. al. trans., Pantheon Books 1980). As Foucault's biographer, Paul Rabinowwrites
"[Tihere is a consistent imperative, played out with varying emphases, which runs through
Foucault's historical studies: to discover the relations of specific scientific disciplines and
particular social practices .... ." Paul Rabinow, Introduction to THE FOUCAULT READER 4-5
(Paul Rabinow ed., Pantheon Books 1984). "Foucault confronts this challenge, this threat, by
refusing to separate off knowledge from power. His strategy has been to focus his work, both
political and intellectual, on what he sees as the greatest threat-that strange, somewhat unlikely,
mixing of the social science and social practices developed around subjectivity." Id. at 4-7. In
Foucault's writing, much of which focused on the development of contemporary professional
knowledge, the professions are sites of power/knowledge but the knowledge they produce is
reproduced throughout the society, becoming itself a form ofdomination. See generally, MICHEL
FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION (1965) (on psychiatry); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE
BIRTH OF THE CLINIC (A. M. Sheridan Smith trans., Pantheon Books 1973) (1963) (on the
development of clinical medicine); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH (Alan Sheridan
trans., Pantheon Books 1977) (1975) (on the penal system and the social sciences) [hereinafter
DISCIPLINE]. Foucault's thought has exerted a strong influence on legal ethnography because of
his concern with the construction and manipulation of power.
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That is, couples are neither staying apart nor calling the police, yet the
discourse of their disputes is changed and transformed into a more legally
acceptable form. Their conversations reveal the educating and sanctioning
power of "user friendly" legal processes, such as protective orders and
mediation-again even when these processes do not work in intended and
paradigmatic ways. In using and reinterpreting legal ideas, parents' ways of
thinking and acting come into conformity with legal norms. This is true even
when conforming does not also change the balance of power between them.
Further, the successful parent's way of speaking becomes more legalistic as
the forum becomes more formal.
As a first step in this legalization, the issuance of a temporary restraining
order changes the discourse of the power struggle from one of physical
violence and control over the co-parent's body (upon threat of police response
and imprisonment) to a contest over a critical space that contains the
children.96 Thus, David may be able to nudge Shoshanna out of the house
with his words, but he cannot abuse her body. Similarly, Laura can summon
the police if John crosses her doorstep, rather than hitting him on the head
with a bottle of wine. The authority to use force is transferred to the legal
system, but the ability to defend personal space is strengthened. Concomitant
with this transfer, the parents' disputes become coded in the language of the
law. Thus, David, Laura, and Craig all edge their respective spouses out of
the family home by pegging their positions to a legal claim of proprietary
exclusiveness.' Even during arguments at home, the presence of a protective
order channels the dispute into a more legally acceptable form, regardless of
whether the more or less powerful spouse prevails.

96. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
97. This change from the control of bodies to the control of spaces instantiates another of
Foucault's basic ideas-that systems of power/knowledge operate by defining and manipulating
social spaces and the social meanings of human bodies. For example in DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH,
Foucault traces the history of modem state social control as a progression from punishment of
the body (capital punishment and torture), to spatial confinement and surveillance (prison), to
discipline of the mind and body according to the dictates of the social sciences. DISCIPLINE, supra
note 95.
Foucault has been consistently interested in the shifting ways that the body and the
social institutions related to it have entered into political relations. In the first mode of
objectification (the dividing practices), the constituted subject can be seen as a victim
caught in the processes of objectification and constraint-most obviously the case for
prisoners and mental patients. Although there are parallel developments associated with
the second mode of objectification (scientific classification), the relation to domination
is more oblique. For example, in The Birth of the ClinicFoucault demonstrates how the
body was increasingly treated as a thing during the nineteenth century, and how this
objectification was paralleled and complemented by the dividing practices instituted in
the clinic's spatial, temporal, and social compartamentalizations.
Rabinow, supra note 95, at 10.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss3/2

50

Kandel: Squabbling in the Shadows: What the Law Can Learn from the Way Di

1997]

SQUABBLING IN THE SHADOWS

In mediation, the discourse of the parties is further induced to conform to
legally preferred standards. In arguments at home, the stronger parent can
prevail by "talking law" in a rather loose way and convincing the other parent
that his or her legal interpretation is correct. Thus, Laura can get John out of
the house by acting as though she has a protective order, even when she does
not, and David can get Shoshanna out of the house by convincing her that he
will get custody because the house is his separate property and because the
judge likes him. By contrast, to make "mileage points" towards a desired
custodial allocation out of the presence of a protective order, a parent must
peg his or her position to either the implicit nexus test, the specific scheduling
rule, or the stable home issue-that is, to a genuine legal principle that is of
concern to the mediator.9" Thus, Laura is easily able to establish a strict
visitation schedule because she is able to satisfy the nexus test and because her
desire for a strict schedule conforms to a legally favored policy. By contrast,
Craig is unable to convince the mediator to support his request for open and
flexible visitation despite the fact that he, like Laura, holds a temporary
protective order. Finally, although the mediator regards Alicia as a genuine
domestic violence victim, she does not get support for her request for
monitored visitation because, in the mediator's mind, this requires a steeper
nexus test-a danger of serious physical abuse.
Even more than in arguments at home, the complexities of mediation
create a forum where legal power and interpersonal power intersect, making
it less likely that sheer interpersonal power will prevail. True enough,
rhetorical skill is vital to obtaining a desired custodial allocation, and as we
have seen, rhetorical skill is to some extent related to interpersonal power.
Thus, Laura is successful in limiting John's visitation by pegging her requests
to the nexus test: by talking about how frightened the children are. Achieving
98. Several anthropologists who have studied proselitigants in various forums have observed
that those who talk of rights, rather than simply of relationships, are more successful with legal
personnel. See, e.g., JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS
(1990); BARBARA YNGVESSON, VIRTUOUS CrIZENS, DISRUPTIVE SUBJEcTS: ORDER AND COMPLAINT INA NEw ENGLAND COURT (1993); John M. Conley & William M. O'Barr, Rules Versus
Relationships in Small Claims Disputes in CONFLICT TALK 178 (Allen D. Grimshaw ed.,
Cambridge University Press 1990); John M. Conley & William M. O'Barr, Fundamentalsof
Jurisprudence:An EthnographyofJudicialDecisionMaking in Informal Courts,66 N.C. L. REV.
467 (1988). In reviewing Yngvesson's book, Alan Hunt writes, "I was struck by a number of
incidents described where there was an interesting interplay in which complainants and officials
both invoked the discourses of rights. Complainants made use of a broad extralegal 'rights talk'
in the form of a normative justification of their conduct while officials spoke in the narrower
language of legal rights." Alan Hunt, Law Community and EverydayLife, 21 L. & Soc. INQUIRY
173, 179 (1996). Hunt's insight and the data discussed in this article suggest a need to refine the
current wisdom on the importance of "talking rights." It is not simply "rights talk" that is
successful in legal situations, but what I would call "closeness of fit." Even in so informal a
forum as a mediation, the more a participant speaks to specific issues, principles, and concerns,
the more successful that participant will be.
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this limitation, however, requires a certain legalistically calculated verbal
assertiveness. Shoshanna is unable to do likewise by merely responding that
Josh cries. Rhetorical skill in mediation is more than having the ability to
speak persuasively-it is knowing what to say. Thus, Craig is as unable as
John to obtain the flexible visitation he seeks, although Craig is outspoken,
insistent, and even argumentative, while John is powerlessly inarticulate.
Along similar lines, Laura successfully limits John's visitation time by
concentrating on the children's need for stable, predictable schedules, whereas
Shoshanna's concern that her mother-in-law is usurping her parental function
fails to impress the mediator because it reveals that Josh is receiving proper
care. In mediation, interpersonal power and legal power are more intimately
intertwined, and the balance can be tipped by learning what to say and how to
say it.
In their classic article, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law," Professors
Mnookin and Kornhauser posited that the introduction of no-fault divorce and
gender neutral custody law brought an indeterminacy to family law decisionmaking that would result in more lawyer-negotiated (as opposed to judgedecided) divorce arrangements and more private ordering of divorce
agreements in the light of general legal principles. While emphasizing a
process of private ordering that approximated contract negotiations, Mnookin
and Kornhauser apparently, thought that the negotiating would be done by
attorneys acting as zealous but emotionally detached advocates. In slighting the
role that men and women play in negotiating their own divorces and shaping
their own agreements, Mnookin and Kornhauser's revolutionary imagining of
family law fell short of being prophetic.
Contemporary empirical and ethnographic scholarship revealing the voice
and action of law's everyday users demonstrates that ordinary people both
incorporate legal concepts into their daily negotiations and reinterpret and
reintroduce those concepts to the law. 100 Family law has recently accelerated
this dynamic interaction by breaking down the division between formal and
informal legal systems through the development of "user friendly" legal
processes, 10' such as temporary restraining orders and court sponsored
99. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
100. See, e.g., SUSAN CouTN, THE CULTURE OF PROTEST: RELIGIOUS AcTIVISM AND THE
U.S. SANCTUARY MOVEMENT (1993) (describing how activists reinterpret the meaning of
immigration laws and decisions); CONTESTED STATES (Mindie Lazarus-Black & Susan F. Hirsch
eds., 1994); supra note 2 and sources cited.
101. I am decidedly not the first to use the computer lingo "user-friendly" to refer to protective
orders and mediation. See, e.g., Alan Kirtley, The MediationPrivilege'sTransitionfrom Theory
to Implementation:Designing aMediation PrivilegeStandardto ProtectMediationParticipants,
the Processand the Public Interest, 1995 J.DisP. RESOL. 1 (1995).
Mediation is user-friendly. Legal rules of procedure and evidence do not apply,
witnesses are not called, attorneys often are not present, there are no limits on what
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mediation, which feuding couples can access and employ either pro se or
outside the presence of their attorneys. There is a porous boundary between
such "user friendly" legal processes and the domestic squabbles and power
dynamics of estranged couples that allows legal principles to percolate into and
be altered by their everyday users.
Even when this boundary does not alter interpersonal power relationships,
it changes the discourse of disagreement to conform more closely to the law's
preferred behavioral norms. Its significance and limits in shaping the private
ordering of family law agreements deserve more recognition by legal scholars
and lawyers alike. For ill or good, putting more of family law into people's
hands also puts more of the law into people's heads. When this occurs,
ordinary people do not merely become obedient to the law's dictates, but
interpret its postulates, as lawyers do, in innovative ways that further their
own interests.
V. CONCLUSION
This ethnographic article has analyzed in detail the actual language of three
child custody mediation sessions observed and audiotaped by the author in the
Los Angeles County Superior Court, Conciliation Services Division. The
analysis has focused on the effects of temporary protective orders on child
custody allocations. It has demonstrated that these effects are significant
because protective orders create legally protected zones around the petitioner/victim and often around the house where he or she may reside with the
children. This protective zone closely parallels the goal of custody law to place
children in stable, tranquil homes. Yet, the effect is not necessarily to protect
the weaker party. In "user friendly" legal processes, where parents represent
themselves and interpret the law on their own, interpersonal power dynamics
play an important role in determining whose version of correctness prevails.
Every site at which the parents interact, whether in arguments at home or
at child custody mediation, becomes a forum in which the significance of the
protective order is contested. The advantage, especially in arguments at home,
often goes to the dominant party. The identity of the dominant party, however,
may not be predictable from gender or legal posture (as petitioner or
respondent on the protective order). Furthermore, even when the interpersonal
power balance is not altered, the discourse is altered. To prevail, even in an
argument at home, one parent must convince the other that the law is on his

information may be presented, [and] no record is made ....Because of its informality
mediation is a faster, cheaper and less adversarial method of resolving disputes than
traditional legal proceedings. This informality is not without its risks.
Id. at 8. I may, however, be the first scholar to call attention to the burgeoning development of
a full-fledged "user-friendly" legal track and the importance, for family lawyers, of knowing
what their clients do with it.
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or her side. Thus, the ability to talk and argue about the law becomes
important.
In mediation, rhetorical skill, interpersonal power, and legal power are
related on a more complex level. Rhetorical skill is not merely a function of
the ability and will to speak; it is a function of the knowledge necessary to
bring one's statements under the umbrella of legal concerns that govern child
custody. Such a composite still can be crucial, especially when a mediator's
support is not readily forthcoming. Thus, legal knowledge becomes a weapon
of interpersonal power.
This suggestion indicates the vital importance of a new and broader kind
of client education. Legal scholars and practicing lawyers need to be aware
that the "user friendly" legal process means that clients are "talking law" at
home and that whoever wins these un-counselled arguments may affect the
final custody and residence agreements as much as a lawyer's actions. Further,
they need to educate their clients in the substantive law to an extent that goes
beyond mere knowledge of rights. The substantive knowledge necessary to
debate the legal limits of a protective order, or to argue for a specific custodial
allocation in terms that conform to underlying legal concerns (such as stability,
developmental appropriateness, or predictability) may work to tip the balance
of interpersonal power for a client and may ultimately be outcome determinative.
Similarly, mediators, in striving to rectify power imbalances between
contesting parties, should look to the deep ways in which interpersonal power
dynamics and rhetorical skill are interwoven in patterns that are not selfevident from superficial categories, such as who is the petitioner or respondent
on a protective order. Mediators need to be aware that for many couples
mediation is merely one link in a chain of user-friendly legal resources and
remedies that parents access and incorporate into intimate arguments and
fights, often to the advantage of the dominant parent.
Protective orders, for example, may be used by a parent strategically (not
merely defensively) to position that parent as the exclusive occupant of the
family home, with de facto custody of the children. Similarly, because the
subordinate spouse is often the shier spouse, mediators should consider
employing techniques to elicit the full stories from reluctant spouses, thereby
facilitating the achievement of narrative equality between them. 1° By
actively listening to such stories, mediators can come to understand how the

102. For fuller discussion of the significance and technique of eliciting stories of comparable
fullness from mediation participants see Sara Cobb, A Narrative Perspective on Mediation:
Toward the Materializationof the 'Storytelling' Metaphor, in NEW DIRECTIONS INMEDIATION:
COMMUNICATION RESEARCH AND PERSPEcTIVE 48 (Joseph P. Folger & Tricia S. Jones eds.,
1994); Sara Cobb, Empowerment andMediation:A NarrativePerspective,9 NEGOTIATION J. 245
(1993); Randy Frances Kandel, Power Plays: A Sociolinguistic Study of Inequality in Child
Custody Mediation and a Hearsay Analog Solution, 36 ARiz. L. REv. 879 (1994).
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parents have "talked law" or "manipulated law" prior to the mediation session
and how that has affected their defacto custodial allocations.
Unfortunately, such deeper knowledge of interparental power dynamics
poses a dilemma to child custody mediators because of the ambiguities inherent
in the responsibility to simultaneously empower parents, protect children's best
interests, and facilitate harmonious agreements. However, enhanced insight
can only lead to sharpened judgment as mediators inevitably and continuously
balance these responsibilities in accordance with personal ethical standards,
techniques, and case-by-case contexts.
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